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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic Investigation of Discount Factors   
for Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Emission Offsets. (May 2004) 
Man-Keun Kim, B.S., Korea University; 
M.S., Korea University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bruce A. McCarl 
 
This dissertation analyzes the basis for and magnitudes of discount factors based on the 
characteristics of greenhouse gas emission (GHGE) offsets that are applied to the GHGE 
reduction projects, concentrating on agricultural projects.  Theoretical approaches to 
discount factors, estimation and incorporation of discount factors procedures are 
developed.  Discount factors would be imposed by credit purchasers due to 
noncompliance with regulatory program of the credits with GHG program including 
consideration of shortfall penalties and limited durations.  Discount factors are proposed 
for (i) additionality, (ii) leakage, (iii) permanence, and (iv) uncertainty. 
Additionality arise when the region where an AO project is being proposed 
would have substantial adoption of the AO practice in the absence of GHG programs 
(business as usual GHGE offset).   
iv 
 
 Leakage arises when the effect of a program is offset by an induced increase in 
economic activity and accompanying emissions elsewhere.  The leakage effect depends 
on demand and supply elasticities.     
Permanence reflects the saturation and volatility characteristics of carbon 
sequestration.  Carbon is stored in a volatile form and can be released quickly to the 
atmosphere when an AO practice is discontinued.  The permanence discount depends on 
the project design including practice continuation after the program and the dynamic rate 
of offset.  Also, consideration of multiple offsets is important. 
Uncertainty arises due to the stochastic nature of project quantity. The 
uncertainty discount tends to be smaller the larger the size of the offset contract due to 
aggregation over space and time.  
The magnitude of these discounts is investigated in Southeast Texas rice 
discontinuation study.  The additionality and the leakage discounts are found to play an 
important role in case of rice lands conversion to other crops but less so for pasture 
conversions and yet less for forest conversions.  The permanence discount is important 
when converting to other crops and short rotation forestry.   
When all discounts are considered, rice lands conversion to forest yields 
claimable credits amounting to 52.8% ~ 77.5% of the total offset.  When converting rice 
lands to pasture, the claimable credits 45.1% ~ 64.2%, while a conversion of rice lands 
to other crops yields claimable credits 38.9% ~ 40.4%.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Global Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol 
Naturally occurring greenhouse gases (GHGs) include water vapor, carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and ozone (O3) (US EPA, 2001).  All are 
continuously emitted to and removed from the atmosphere by natural processes on Earth.  
However, human activities, primarily burning of fossil fuels and changes in land cover, 
have caused an increase in GHG emissions.  In turn, atmospheric GHG concentration 
increases are strongly implicated as contributors to climatic changes that have been 
observed during the 20th century (McCarthy et al.).  GHG emissions (GHGE) and 
concentrations are expected to continue to increase.  
Increased atmospheric GHG concentrations produce radiative forcing by 
changing either the reflection or absorption of solar radiation, or the emission and 
absorption of terrestrial radiation (Houghton et al.).  During the 20th century, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) asserts that global average surface 
temperature rose approximately 0.6°C (1.0 °F) due to these changes (Houghton et al.). 
Changes in atmospheric GHG composition are likely to alter temperatures, 
precipitation patterns, sea level, extreme events, and other aspects of climate on which 
 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 
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the natural environment and human systems depend (McCarthy et al.).  Regarding 
agriculture, climate change is expected to vary the growing environment for agricultural 
production, and in turn affect yields, regional production characteristics, resource usage, 
and market conditions (Adams et al., 1990; Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw; Adams, 
Hurd, and Reilly). 
The issue of climate change has become a widely discussed policy topic because 
of its potential consequences and its inherent complexity.  The IPCC asserts that climate 
change effects may be irreversible and that resultant damages are uncertain.  Numerous 
researchers believe that negative impacts of climate change will likely outweigh benefits 
(Bruce, Lee, and Haites; Zelek and Shively), although economic and ecological 
consequences of climate change are a subject of debate (Reddy and Price).   
Recognizing possible adverse impacts caused by global climate change, 165 
countries negotiated and signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), which sets a goal of long-term stabilization of GHG concentrations 
in atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the 
climate in 1992 (United Nations, 1992) 
In 1997, the conference of the parties to the UNFCCC yielded the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP), which sets emission limits on CO2 and other GHGs commencing with the 
period 2008 – 2012 (UNFCCC).  The KP contains emission targets and timetables for 39 
industrialized countries, mainly developed nations in North America, Europe, Asia and 
Australia.  The KP requires participating countries to reduce GHGE by 5 to 8 percent 
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relative to the 1990 emission levels during the first commitment period.  The U.S. KP 
obligation was to reduce emission by seven percent. 
However, in 2001, the U.S. announced that it would not participate in the 
implementation of the KP (White House, 2001).  The Bush Administration objected to 
the KP on three reasons: (i) lack of a long-term goal based on science, (ii) exclusion of 
developing nations such as China and India, whose GHGE are projected to grow rapidly, 
and (iii) economic costs of mitigation actions.  Later, President Bush announced an 
emission reduction program that involves an 18 percent reduction in GHGE intensity 
(emissions per dollar GDP) by 2012 (White House, 2002).  This plan is estimated to be 
less restrictive than the KP plan. 
Agricultural GHGE Offset  
One of the mitigation alternatives includes the development of Agricultural GHGE 
Offset (AO) activities in the form of emission reductions and/or carbon sequestration.  
Several studies examine the possibility that agricultural producers can reduce emissions 
and sequester carbon by adopting management or land use changes (Rausmussen and 
Parton; Lal et al.; McConkey and Lindwall; McCarl and Schneider, 2000, 2001).  
Considerable attention is focused on the possibility of encouraging the AO practices 
because it may be a relatively inexpensive way to reduce net GHGE (National Academy 
of Sciences; Bruce, Lee and Haites; McCarl and Schneider, 2000, 2001). 
There are at least four ways agriculture may participate in or be influenced by 
GHGE mitigation efforts; (i) Agriculture is a source of GHGE and may need to reduce 
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net emissions, (ii) Agriculture may enhance its absorption of GHG from the atmosphere 
by creating or expanding sinks, (iii) Agriculture may provide products which substitute 
for GHGE intensive products by for example producing bio-fuels and (iv) Agriculture 
may find itself operating in a world where commodity and input prices have been altered 
by GHGE related policies (McCarl and Schneider, 2000).  AO projects mainly relate to 
ways (i) through (iii) above.  
When pursuing a GHGE mitigation program, it will be important for society to 
detect low cost options.  AO practices may be attractive because they can be a relatively 
inexpensive way to reduce net GHGE as well as a ways to increase economic 
opportunities for agricultural producers (Dixon et al.; Sampson and Sedjo; Marland and 
Schlamadinger).  Also AO practices can be appealing since they can contribute to other 
agricultural and environmental goals (co-benefits) by increasing biodiversity or 
decreasing soil erosion (McCarl, Murray and Antle).  
There are two major types of practices that can be employed to offset GHGE via 
agriculture: changes in land management and changes in land use.  The commonly 
discussed management changes involve changes in crop mix, tillage systems, nutrients 
applied and residue management.  Changes in land use involve conversion of croplands 
to other crop mix, pastureland, or forest establishment (Post and Kwon; McConkey and 
Lindwall; McCarl, Murray and Antle).   
Many U.S. GHGE offset policy proposals in the AO arena emphasize the 
allocation of agricultural lands to forest uses, so-called, afforestation option (Parks and 
Hardie).  For land-rich countries like the U.S., Canada, and Russia, AO projects can 
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potentially account for significant emission reductions (Feng, Zhao and Kling).  
According to U.S. Department of State, the U.S. could meet half of its emission 
reduction commitment under the Kyoto protocol using agricultural soil sinks, 
combination with forest sinks.  
Economic Considerations 
There are numerous economic considerations involved with the potential proliferation of 
AO strategies.  The most important consideration is trading of project GHGE credits in 
the market.  Credit buyers such as large GHG emitters will purchase the credits if the 
credits cost less than the cost within their operation to reduce an additional unit of GHG.  
And credit sellers, who may be agricultural producers adopting an AO project, will sell 
the credits based if they can be fully compensated for any extra costs incurred to reduce 
or sequester an additional unit of GHG through the AO project.   
From the credit buyer’s point of a view, buying a GHGE credit produced by an 
AO project is no different from buying offset generated by other GHGE mitigation 
options such as direct GHGE reductions.  They will prefer the credits from an AO 
project when these credits are cheaper than credits from other GHG offset sources.  
Conventionally, direct GHGE reductions are related with reduced use of fossil fuels 
from improving energy efficiencies, increasing conservation, or shifting to non-fossil 
energy sources, etc.  It is argued that if a ton of fossil fuel is not used, its emissions are 
avoided forever.  However, as pointed out by Noble et al., and Herzog, Caldeira and 
Reilly, the idea that a ton of fossil emissions avoided today is avoided forever is not 
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necessarily an accurate characterization of the problem because that unburned fossil fuel 
may still be mined and burned later.   
In this sense, it is important to recognize that credit buyers will compare AO 
projects with other mitigation options in an effort to assemble a minimum cost portfolio. 
These comparisons should be made based on offset characteristics of the quantity of 
GHGE offset created by each alternative and the ways such offsets can be claimed under 
society wide offset accounting rule and whether these offsets will totally be creditable in 
a GHG program.   
For this comparison, there is a need to determine how AO project offsets will be 
considered as a credit.  In order to measure or monitor the GHGE credits created by the 
AO project, we should consider GHGE offset characteristics discounts as will be 
discussed below.  Relevant characteristics that may be lead to discounts are related to as 
additionality, leakage, permanence, and uncertainty.  
GHGE Offset Discounts  
When an AO project is under consideration, there are some possible discounts that may 
arise based on the characteristics of GHGE offset in terms of additionality, leakage, 
permanence, and uncertainty.  These factors may reduce the effective GHGE offset. 
Additionality    
Most GHG projects involve a discrete switch in technologies or choice of actions: fossil 
fuel to non-fossil fuel, forest protection versus forest conversion (Chomitz, 2002).  For 
project-based GHGE credits, it is important to determine whether this switch would have 
 7
 
occurred under business-as-usual.  If so, the project is not additional (Chomitz, 2002).  
According to the KP, GHGE reductions from a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
project should be additional to any that would occur in the absence of such activities 
(UNFCCC, Article 12).   
In the AO project context, additionality is a concern when the region where a 
project is being proposed has had substantial historical adoption of the AO practice 
before any GHG programs were implemented and is expected to have additional 
adoption in the future.  In such a case a discount for the region may need to be developed 
to reflect business-as-usual AO practices adoption.   
Additionality can be summarized in the form of the following question: 
 
Before the AO project goes into effect to reduce net GHGE, are there any of the 
projects which are already used and are projected to be used in the future 
without AO related incentives? 
Leakage 
When an AO project succeeds in a place, it can potentially reduce supply of agricultural 
products, and stimulate GHGE elsewhere.  Namely, market forces may encourage 
additional economic activities and associated GHGE in another regions, thereby 
offsetting the reduction in GHGE.  To the extent that this happens, the AO project leaks 
with its GHG offset being reduced by GHGE increases elsewhere. 
Leakage occurs when actions to reduce net GHGE cause alterations in market 
conditions (e.g. price effects) that induce emission increase elsewhere (see Murray, 
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McCarl, and Lee for a review of the concept and literature).  It is noteworthy that 
leakage effects may be substantial because agricultural markets are highly competitive 
and demand and supply are relatively inelastic.  Leakage can be summarized as 
following question: 
If an AO project succeeds, will the GHGE reduction would be offset by marke 
tinduced alterations in practices elsewhere that offset the project induced 
reduction in net GHGE? 
Permanence 
Offsets of GHGE using agricultural soil carbon sequestration are not necessarily 
permanent.  Once an AO project is put into place, annual carbon offsets realized may 
diminish in the long term as the soil and vegetation reach a new equilibrium under the 
land use practice.  Furthermore, when the AO practice is discontinued, the carbon is 
often released quickly (volatile) to the atmosphere.  
In this case, we need discounts for comparing the emissions offset versus the 
benefit gained if the carbon storage were permanent.  Permanence can be summarized in 
the following question: 
If the AO project increases absorption of the carbon into the biosphere, will the 
carbon stay there?  What happens when AO incentives are discontinued or the 
project life expires? 
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Uncertainty 
There are a variety of uncertainties related to an AO project.  The sources of uncertainty 
include variability in the quantity of GHGE offset; sampling error (aggregation error) at 
regional scales; carbon pool measurement errors; and limitations in understanding 
processes controlling future GHGE implications (Birdsey and Heath; Heath and Smith).  
The term uncertainty describes phenomena such as statistical variability, lack of 
knowledge, or surprise.  Uncertainties in quantifying GHGE offset may be caused by 
lack of knowledge.  Also, extreme events such as a forest fire may be categorized as 
surprise. 
The GHGE offsets generated by an AO project may need to be discounted to 
reflect uncertainty.  The simplest way is to represent uncertainty is in the form of a 
confidence interval based on probability density function (PDF).  Uncertainty can be 
summarized as following question: 
Is the quantity of offset uncertain in an AO project? Would buyers or regulators 
be interested in a more certain measure of offset volume than the mean? 
 
Who Imposes GHGE Offset Discounts? 
As argued above, credit buyers only choose AO projects when the credits evaluated by 
such projects are cheaper than other GHG offset opportunities.  In order to compare two 
possibilities, it is important to determine how much GHGE offset the AO project really 
creates that can be considered as a credit, and thus, an estimate of GHGE offset that may 
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be disallowed.  Also, a government or a regulatory agency needs to figure out how much 
GHGE credits an AO project creates.  
Objectives and Organization of the Dissertation 
The objective of this study is to contribute to develop procedures to apply, and estimate 
applicable discounts in the form of additionality, leakage, permanence, and uncertainty.  
To do this, the work will include (i) development of a conceptual framework for the 
identification of GHGE offset discounts, (ii) development of usable formulas for 
discount estimation, and (iii) investigations of the empirical magnitude of the discounts 
in a case study context.  
This dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter II discusses agricultural 
GHGE offset including carbon sequestration and introduces the conceptual framework 
for the GHGE offset discounts.  In turn, individual investigations of the discounts and 
estimation procedures regarding additionality, leakage, permanence, and uncertainty are 
presented in Chapters III through VI.  Investigations of the empirical magnitude of the 
GHGE discounts for a Southeast Texas appear in Chapter VII. Chapter VIII contains 
concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER II 
GHGE OFFSET DISCOUNTS AND QUANTITY OF GHGE OFFSET 
 Background 
An AO project are not done entirely in isolation and as a consequence, the quantity of 
GHGE offset may be subject to discounts due to concerns of additionality, leakage, 
permanence and uncertainty.  Applying discounts reduces the quantity of GHGE offset 
to the truly salable quantity of GHGE offset, which becomes GHGE credit.  Note that the 
extent of discount GHGE offset depends upon the GHGE regulatory standard.     
As argued in Chapter I, it is important for credit buyers to compare AO projects 
with other mitigation options as other investment portfolio.  These comparisons should 
be made based on economic variables such as the expected carbon price, interest rate and 
the quantity of GHGE offset created by each alternative.  The AO program is considered 
as one of a possible investment because the AO program is not different from direct 
GHGE reductions from a credit buyer’s point of a view (Herzog, Caldeira, and Reilly).  
For doing this, there is a need to determine how much creditable GHGE offsets creates.  
In order to measure the GHGE credits created by the AO project, we need to consider 
GHGE offset discounts such as additionality, leakage, permanence, and uncertainty. 
GHGE Offset Discount 
As a common discount procedure, the GHGE credit (QC) is calculated by (1 )CQ Q δ= × −  
where, Q is the quantity of GHGE offset and δ is the GHGE discount (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1), the 
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amount of not creditable or the credits only for a limited time relative to regulatory 
program length.  Thus, the GHGE discount is simply expressed as follows: 
(1) (%) 100 1 100C CQ Q Q
Q Q
δ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−= × = − ×⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ . 
 
Carbon Prices and GHGE Discounts 
Essentially AO projects contribute credits to firms’ long-term offset requirements so that 
we need to introduce explicit carbon price path and interest rate when we consider GHGE 
discounts.  Now we define the net present value (NPV) of the benefits of gains from the 
AO project as follows: 
(2)  0
0
( ) ( )(1 )
T
t
t
NPV P t Q t r −
=
= +∑  
where P is the carbon price, r is the interest rate, and t is the time (year).  The superscript, 
0, indicates a perfect prospect that is free of concerns on additionality, leakage, 
permanence or uncertainty over time.  When we are concerned with additionality, 
leakage, permanence or uncertainty, then NPV of the benefits from the AO project is:  
(3)  1
0
( ) ( )(1 ( ))(1 )
T
t
t
NPV P t Q t t rδ −
=
= −∑ + , 
or, which under constant discount (δ) becomes:  
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(4) . 1 0
0
( ) ( )(1 )(1 ) (1 )
T
t
t
NPV P t Q t r NPVδ δ−
=
= − + = −∑
From equations (2) and (4), the GHGE discounts can be rewritten as follows:   
(5) 
0 1 1
0 0(%) 100 1 100
NPV NPV NPV
NPV NPV
δ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛−= × = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞×⎟⎠
. 
 
Equation (5) can be reduced to equation (1) because the P(t) and (1 + r)-t terms cancel out 
when the time horizon and Q(t) for NPV 0 and NPV 1 are the same.  If the time horizon or 
emissions are not constant over time (this happens when we deal with permanence issue), 
then equation (1) and (5) are different and we should use equation (5) to estimate the 
GHGE discount. 
Estimation of Agricultural GHGE Offset and Credit
Once we find NPV0 and NPV1 in equation (5), we can compute the GHGE discount.  The 
subsequent section discusses what is the quantity of GHGE offset.   
Agricultural GHGE Offset 
The quantity of agricultural GHGE offset, Q, consists of three parts in the case of the 
AO project, (i) carbon sequestration, (ii) saved emissions from production, and (iii) 
reduction in fossil fuel usage for machinery when tillage is reduced.   
Carbon sequestration 
When land is transformed from natural forest or grassland to agriculture, a large amount of 
the native soil organic matter (SOM) is lost as carbon dioxide emitted to the atmosphere.  
 14
 
On the other hand if land management practices are changed to retain more SOM then 
carbon accumulation may occur which carbon dioxide is effectively removed from the 
atmosphere and put into the soil.  This process is called carbon sequestration (McConkey 
and Lindwall).  Figure 1 illustrates soil carbon changes over time on agriculture lands. 
There are two major types of activities that enhance sequestration: (i) changes in 
land management, and (ii) changes in land use.  Changes in land management involve 
tillage choice, nutrient and residue management such as adopting conservation tillage or 
no-till, adding organic manure, and/or altering fertilization (Lal et al.; McCarl, Murray 
and Antle).  Changes in land use involve (i) conversion of croplands to forest lands, 
grasslands, pasture, rangelands or wetlands, (ii) conversion of pasturelands to forests 
lands, and (iii) restoration of degraded lands to reestablish their organic content (McCarl, 
Murray and Antle).  
 
        Soil Carbon 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Soil C            Soil C         Soil C               Soil C 
    Decrease         Stable         Increase            Stable 
      (Sequestration) (Saturation) 
 
 
Initial      Adoption of                          Time             
Cultivation     AO practice 
 
     Figure 1. Soil carbon changes and adoption of AO practice 
         Modified from McConkey and Lindwall 
 15
 
Direct Reduction 
Agriculture (including rangelands and forestry) can reduce GHGE directly because 
agriculture emits GHGs.  In particular, agriculture releases substantial amounts of CH4, 
N2O and CO2.  Agriculturally based GHG emissions in developing countries largely arise 
from deforestation and land degradation.  Agriculturally based GHG emissions in 
developed countries are largely caused by fossil fuel usage, reductions in soil carbon via 
intensive tillage; nitrous oxide emissions through fertilizer applications, livestock 
feeding, and residue management; and methane emissions from livestock raising and 
rice cultivation.  Agriculture’s global share of anthropogenic emissions has been 
estimated to be about 50% of total CH4, 70% of N2O, and 20% of CO2. 
Agricultural GHGE Credits 
As elaborated in subsequent chapters, we consider (i) additionality, (ii) leakage, (iii) 
permanence, and (iv) uncertainty.  The GHGE credit can be calculated 
as , where ADD indicates the 
additionality discount, LEAK the leakage discount, PERM the permanence discount and 
UNCER the uncertainty discounts. 
(1 )(1 )(1 )(1 )CQ Q ADD LEAK PERM UNCER= − − − −
Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter, we define the GHGE offset discount and the agricultural GHGE offset. 
The GHGE offset discount arises due to concerns of additionality, leakage, permanence 
and uncertainty.  Applying discounts adjust the quantity of GHGE offset generated by an 
AO program so it equals the effective amount of salable GHGE offsets which is the 
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GHGE credit.  The GHGE discount is defined as one minus the ratio of the net benefit 
gained from GHGE credit created by the AO project compared the net benefit gained 
from GHGE offset.  
The agricultural GHGE offset is defined as net reductions in agricultural GHGE 
coupled with net increases in carbon sequestration.  Changes in land management and 
changes in land use can lead to reductions in GHGE and enhancement of GHG sinks. 
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CHAPTER III 
ESTIMATE OF ADDITIONALITY DISCOUNT 
Background 
Most GHG projects involve a discrete switch in technologies, management or land use, 
for example, fossil fuel to non-fossil fuel, forest protection versus forest conversion 
(Chomitz, 2002).  For project-based GHGE offsets, it is important to determine whether 
this switch would have occurred in the absence of GHG projects under business-as-
usual.  If so, the project is not additional (Chomitz, 2002). 
Additionality has been a prominent concern in the international GHGE control 
dialogue.  For example, in the Kyoto Protocol (KP), provisions state that GHGE 
reductions under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are required to be 
additional to any that would occur in the absence of such activities (UNFCCC, Article 
12). 
In the context of an AO project, additionality concerns arise when the region where 
the project is to be implemented has had substantial adoption of the AO practice before 
any GHG programs are implemented and that this adoption is projected to continue in the 
absence of the project.  In such a case, the offsets created by the project are not entirely 
additional and a discount may be needed to reflect business-as-usual AO practice adoption 
and accompanying net emission reductions.   
The basic question is what portion of the GHGE offset benefits would have 
occurred under business-as-usual, commonly called baseline and thus how much is 
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additionally stimulated by the AO project.  If a significant amount of the AO practice 
would have been adopted naturally, then a discount is in order to reflect non-additional 
reduction tat cannot be claimed under the regulatory structure.   
The following sections conceptualize the problem, develop an analytical 
approach for additionality and explain the asymmetric information problem between the 
credit buyers and producers.  
Analytical Approach for Additionality 
The Basic Problem  
As argued in previous chapters, the GHGE credit buyers and the government agency or 
regulatory agency need to measure GHGE credits or how much GHGE credits are really 
created.  Unfortunately, they are unable to observe the GHGE offset from the adoption 
of the AO practice at reasonable cost because the GHGE offset is produced widely 
across the landscape.  The credit buyers or the governmental agency can only form 
expectations conditioned on observations of the land management (e.g., no-till), land use 
change (e.g., afforestation), other relevant data such as weather, and periodic measurement 
based on samples.  Assume that general form of the agency’s GHGE offset is 
(6) ( , , )Q g k w ε= , 
where Q is the true GHGE offset from the land use alternatives k (the AO practice) 
which are unobservable; w is a random variable such as weather and ε is a random 
variable representing the agency’s imperfect knowledge of the Q.  Thus, there are two 
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sources of uncertainty about GHGE offset.  One is imperfect information about the 
GHGE offset process itself, denoted by ε and the other is ex ante uncertainty about 
weather condition, denoted by w.   The credit buyers and agency’s joint density for ε and 
w is given by ( , )f w ε , then the expected GHGE offset created by the land use k is 
(7) ( ) ( , , ) ( , )Q k g k w f w dwdε ε ε= ∫ ∫ . 
Assume that MC denotes the marginal cost schedule for agricultural producers 
who adopt the AO project to create one unit of GHGE offset in specific area.  The 
marginal cost, MC, is the payment required for a producer to adopt and keep the AO 
practice.  Note that MC is the function of land use k and specialized knowledge of the 
operation of the farm or producer, θ .  The parameter θ  is an index of producer 
profitability (the producer “type”) known to the producer but not to the agency.  The 
parameter θ  might be interpreted as an index of a producer’s managerial ability or an 
index of soil quality or a composite index of both (Smith and Tomasi).   
Additionality with Perfect Information 
As argued above, there are uncertainties in Q and there exist asymmetric information 
between the producer and the credit buyers and agency due to the parameter θ .  With 
perfect information, θ  is known to the credit buyers and the agency so that they can 
estimate ( , )MC k θ  for the producer who adopts the AO project.  The producer who 
participates in the AO project would receive ( , )MC k Qθ ⋅ , where Q is perfectly 
observable.  
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Figure 2.  GHGE offset and additionality 
 
 
 
It is noteworthy that the producer would convert land to the AO practice under 
business-as-usual when ( , )MC k θ  is less than or equal to zero, because an incentive for 
producer exists without any GHG program.  In such a case, Q by adoption of the AO 
project is not additional.  This is illustrated in Figure 2.   
Assume that the GHGE offset supply is a step function, which is equivalent to each 
producer’s marginal cost to offset GHGE, that is ( , )MC k θ .  Suppose that there are 7 
types of producers and marginal cost increase with higher values of θ .  Also we assume 
that the GHGE credit demand is a downward sloping linear function, denoted by D. When 
the GHGE offset price offered is ( ,7)MC k  then, all producers will adopt the AO practice 
and they offset GHGE by q7, which may be the maximum Q in this area.   
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If the GHGE offset price in the market is ( , 4)MC k , then 4 of producers would 
change their land use to the AO practice and offset GHGE by q4.  Notice that producer 
types 1, and 2 have a negative or zero marginal cost so producers 1 and 2 would adopt 
the AO project voluntarily without any GHG program.  Thus GHGE offset q2 is not 
additional.   
When we compute the salable GHGE offset, that is the GHGE credit, we need to 
consider this portion in terms of additionality discount.  As we can see, salable GHGE 
credit (QC) is (q4 – q2).  If the GHGE credit price increase to ( ,5)MC k due to larger 
GHGE credit demand, then producers create q5 GHGE offset and in turn, QC = (q5 – q2).  
From equation (1) in Chapter II, additionality discount (ADD) can be found as follows: 
(8) (Total Offset Baseline Offset) Baseline Offset1 1
Total Offset Total Offset
CQADD
Q
−= − = − =  
Based on equation (8), ADD is q2/q4 when the GHGE offset price is offered by 
( , 4)MC k  and ADD is q2/q5 when the GHGE credit price is ( ,5)MC k .  It is noteworthy 
that ADD would be affected by the GHGE offset prices in the market.  When the GHGE 
price is low, ADD would be large and when the GHGE price is high, then ADD would be 
small. 
Additionality with Imperfect Information 
As pointed above, the parameter θ  is known to producers but not to the credit buyers 
and the government agency.  From their perspective, θ  is a random variable with 
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density function, ( )h θ .  Therefore, there exists asymmetric information between the 
agricultural producer and the credit buyers and the agency.  Asymmetric access to 
information is a problem for calculating GHGE credits.  Because participation in the AO 
project is voluntary, certain baseline allocation methods have the risk of selection bias 
(adverse selection problem) (Fischer).   
Producers may be expected to acquire specialized information about their farm 
operations and they are notoriously reluctant to reveal their profitability to public 
agencies (Shortle and Dunn).  In such a case, the credit buyers and the agency do not 
observe producer’s type and ( , )MC k θ  because they cannot discern low-cost producers 
(for instance, type 1 and 2 producers in the above example) so that the GHGE offset 
supply curve in Figure 2 cannot be found.  In other words, estimate of the additionality 
discount is impossible. 
The existence of such a differential information structure is often assumed in the 
literature on choices among policy instruments (Weitzman; Adar and Griffin; Roberts 
and Spence; Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin; Shortle and Dunn; Smith and Tomasi; 
Millock, Sunding and Zilberman). 
Economic theory offers ideas for designing contracts to induce project 
proponents to reduce such distortion, or even to fully reveal what type producers are 
(Fischer).  This involves offering the producers a menu of different combinations of 
quantities (e.g., production, management, or GHGE offset) and corresponding prices 
(Chomitz, 1998).   
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However, Fischer insists that this approach is either impractical or inapplicable 
because this revelation mechanism assumes that actual GHGE offsets can be established, 
albeit with a cost to monitoring.  In other words, GHGE baseline offsets in the absence 
of the project cannot be observed although actual GHGE offset can be observed (Bohm). 
The most straightforward approach to baseline determination under imperfect 
information is the direct questioning: asking the producer what would be done in the 
absence of the GHGE offset project (Chomitz, 1998).  However, potential drawbacks of 
this approach include respondents’ inability to deal with hypothetical questions, their 
incentive to answer strategically, and their reluctant to admit to free riding (Waldman 
and Ozog). 
Another conceivable approach to overcome the asymmetric information problem 
for computing the baseline is the control group methods: observing the behavior of a 
comparison group not offered incentives to sell GHGE offsets (Chomitz, 1998).  But this 
approach has drawbacks which include the difficulty in finding a valid control group. 
The other approach to baseline determination is the economic modeling such as 
Agricultural Sector Model (ASM).  This means constructing a model describing how 
producers would behave in the absence of offset incentives and predicting whether the 
producer would adopt the GHGE project in the absence of offset incentives (Chomitz, 
1998).  But it is difficult to calibrate the model because some crucial parameters to be 
specified for model are hard to observe, subject to misrepresentation, subject to strategic 
manipulation, and subject to change (Chomitz, 1998). 
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In this paper, we propose a different approach to determine baseline offsets, so 
called the project-based approach.  In this approach, we assume all producers in specific 
area are provided the GHGE offset project monetary incentive, ( , )MC k θ .  But, as we 
discussed above, ( , )MC k θ  cannot be estimated due to asymmetric information.  In 
determining ( , )MC k θ  to be paid, the credit buyers or the government agency considers 
the amount necessary to encourage producers of eligible land to participate in the GHGE 
offset program.  For doing this, the density function ( )h θ  would be conjectured based on 
producers’ historical cropping records, site-based soil productivity, and prevailing local 
rental rates, etc.  Based on the density function ( )h θ , *( , )MC k θ  can be found as follows:  
(9) 
*
*( ) ( , ) ( )dMC k MC k h
θ θ θ θ θ== ∫ ,  
where *( )MC k  is the maximum marginal cost over producers to offset a certain amount 
of GHGE.  Producers may offer land at this price or offer a lower price to enhance the 
GHGE offset and their offer will be accepted.  For example, when θ = 5, projected 
GHGE offset is q5 under this price because type 6 and 7 producers will not participate in 
this program in Figure 3. 
Assume that the credit buyer and the agency can compute the adoption rate for 
the AO practice based on data such as historical land transition.  That is, the historical 
land transition is interpreted as producers’ behavior in the absence of the GHGE offset 
incentives.  In this case, ADD would be q2/q5 when we assume that baseline offset is 
equivalent to q2 in Figure 3. 
 25
 
GHGE Credit 
Price 
                         
 
            
                       Hypothetical Demand for AO Credit                                            h(θ) 
 
 
 
 
 
     * ( )MC k  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         q1           q2              q3             q4              q5             q6             q7             Q  
                                                                                                                                         
 
 
AO Offset Based on        Projected AO 
Historical adoption of the AO   Offset 
Practice (Baseline) 
 
 
Figure 3.  Project-based approach and additionality 
 
 
 
Under the project-based approach baseline determination is easy because we 
need historical data and estimates of expected GHGE offset created by the land use k 
which is provided in equation (7).  However, error in the estimate of ADD is 
unavoidable, which is used as the difference between the true ADD and the estimated 
ADD, because baseline estimation requires quantification of what does not occur.  In 
other words, precise baseline estimation is impossible so that the estimate of ADD 
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should be biased.  However, we cannot decide whether it is overestimated or 
underestimated.     
Derivation of Additionality Using Project-Based Approach 
As discussed above, actual ADD cannot be obtained easily due to asymmetric 
information.  In this section, we formalize the project-based approach.  We assume that 
all land managers either voluntarily or through coercion adopt the AO project when the 
AO project is implemented in the specific region under average GHGE price level.  
Also, we assume that GHGE credit demand is sufficient to buy all of GHGE offsets 
created in this area under this price.  Finally, we assume that the baseline GHGE offset 
can be computed based on extrapolation of historical adoption trends for the AO 
practice. 
If the rate of change in land use or the rate of conversion is known, the baseline 
AO offsets from a set of k alternative land use changes or management changes can be 
calculated as follows.  Note that we assume that net AO offset rate (SR) is known 1. 
(10)   ( ) ( ) ( )
K
k k
k
B t A CR t SR= ⋅ ⋅∑ t
 
                                                
 
where, B(t) is the total amount of baseline GHGE reductions in time t, A is the total 
project area, CRk(t) is the baseline proportional rate of adoption of AO alternative k in 
 
1 Note that SR indicates the per-acre quantity of GHGE offset and Q indicates the quantity of GHGE 
offset. In other words, A⋅SR = Q. 
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time t, and  is net AO offset rate for alternative k in time t.  The net present value 
of the baseline quantification over time (NPV
( )kSR t
B) will be: 
(11) 
0
( ) ( )(1 )
T
B t
t
NPV P t B t r −
=
= +∑  
Now consider an AO project that is implemented in year 0.  The net present 
value of the projected GHGE offset over time (NPVP) is: 
(12) 
0
( ) ( )(1 )
T
P t
AO
t
NPV P t A SR t r −
=
= ⋅ +∑   
where,  is net AO offset rate for an AO practice in time t.  From equations (11) 
and (12), an additionality discount (ADD) can be found as follows after P(t) and (1+r)
( )AOSR t
-t 
terms are cancelled out: 
(13) 0
0
( )
(%) 100 100
( )
T
B
t
TP
AOt
t
B t
NPVADD
NPV A SR t
=
=
= × = ×
⋅
∑
∑
 
To demonstrate this, an example is used.  First, assume the project activity is 
afforestation, second, assume the project area (A) is 10,000 acres, third, assume the net 
AO offset rate ( ) is 1 ton/ac/year of carbon equivalent and this rate remains 
constant over time.  Fourth, assume the program continues for 100 years (T).  Fifth, 
assume that baseline rate of afforestation ( ) is 0.5% per year and that there is only 
one alternative (k = 1) for conversion of project area to forestry.  Thus, 0.5% of cropland 
( )AOSR t
( )kCR t
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converts to the forest a year under business-as-usual.  In other words, afforestation 
occurs at the rate of 0.5% in the absence of the AO project.   
From the above assumptions, the project GHGE offset is 10,000 tons/year for 
100 years and total projected GHGE offset would be 1 million tons.  The amount of 
baseline cumulative GHGE offset can be computed as (See Table 1 single offset 
column): 
 
 Year 1: 10,000 acres × 1 ton/ac × 0.5% = 50 tons 
 Year 2: Year 1 + (10,000 acres × 1 ton/ac × 0.5%) = 100 tons 
 Year 3: Year 2 + (10,000 acres × 1 ton/ac × 0.5%) = 150 tons 
 Year 50: 2,500 tons 
 Year 100: 5,000 tons 
 
The amount of cumulative baseline offset would be 252,500 tons.  From equation 
(13), ADD is 25%.  It implies that 25% of the projected GHGE offsets would have 
happened naturally and thus, GHGE credit should be adjusted downward to only leave 
the additional portion.   
Consider another example that involves multiple land-uses.  Assume that k = 2 
and the under baseline conditions the AO project area would be partially converted to 
forestlands and pasturelands at rates of 0.25% per year, respectively.  Total conversion 
rate is 0.5% as in above example.  If the net AO offset rate is the same in both forests 
and pasturelands, ADD will be the same.  But the more interesting case involves 
differing net AO offset rates.  Let’s assume that the net AO offset rate of pasturelands is 
0.5 tons/ac/yr, which is half of the afforestation rate. 
 29
 
Table 1. Baseline and Project Carbon Sequestration with Single Offset 
Single Offset Multi-Offset 
Baseline Baseline  Year 
Forest (ton) Forest (ton) Pasture (ton) 
Project 
1 50 25 12.5 10,000 
2 100 50 25.0 10,000 
3 150 75 37.5 10,000 
4 200 100 50.0 10,000 
5 250 125 62.5 10,000 
     
10 500 250 125.0 10,000 
     
15 750 375 187.5 10,000 
     
25 1,250 625 312.5 10,000 
     
50 2,500 1,250 625.0 10,000 
     
100 5,000 2,500 1,250.0 10,000 
Sum 252,500 126,250 63,125 1,000,000 
 
 
   
The baseline GHGE offset is 189,375 tons (= 126,250 tons + 63,125 tons) that is a 
sum of GHGE offset from afforestation and pastureland (See Table 1 multi-offset 
column).  From equation (13), ADD is computed as 19%.  It implies that 19% of the 
projected offsets would have happened naturally and thus, the GHGE offset should be 
adjusted downward by 19%.  
Approaches to Projecting Land Use Change 
Any application of the above requires a baseline estimate of .  In this study, two 
methods are utilized to predict future land uses: (i) A Markov model of land use 
( )kCR t
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transition, and (ii) An econometric model of land uses (land-share model).  Both models 
are developed based upon historical land use change data. 
Markov Model of Land Use Change 
The Markov model has been used to simulate and explore the dynamics of land use 
change.  For example, Bourne used the Markov model to describe and predict land use 
changes inside a city, while Bell used it to investigate land use change patterns on San 
Juan Island, Washington.  Also, Muller and Middleton used the Markov model to 
provide a dynamics of land use changes in Niagara area.   
Data for the Markov model estimation involves historical data on AO practices 
adoption and can be obtained from publicly available sources such as National Resource 
Inventory (NRI), Census of Agriculture, or Forestry Inventory and Analysis (FIA), etc. 
In the GHGE arena, several studies have used the Markov model to estimate 
costs of GHGE offset.  Lubowski, Plantinga and Stavins use a first-order Markov model 
to derive a carbon sequestration supply function.  They estimated the baseline land use 
and simulate the effects of carbon sequestration policy such as subsidies.  Note that the 
conversion probability is set to the function of some explanatory variables and simulated 
to find carbon sequestration supply function.  Murray uses the Markov model in 
Mississippi using 1982 to 1997 data and he finds the baseline conversion rate of 
cropland to forest is 0.67% a year. 
The Markov model is attractive because it can be used easily to predict future 
land use change.  However, model applicability is limited because pre-existing AO 
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practices adoption data are generally available only at high levels of aggregation such as 
nation, region, and/or state (Murray).   
Table 2 contains a Markov land transition matrix where the data in the table 
depict the net flows of land between and within land uses.  Namely, the data in the table, 
Aij gives the acres of land that in the prior period was in land use i that by the end of the 
period converts to land use j.  Note that reading across the ith row we find the acres that 
were converted to another use between observations except in column i shows the acres 
that remain in the original use.  The data in the jth column give the acres that end up in 
the jth use at the end of the period.  The data in Table 2, can be used to obtain a Markov 
probabilistic transition matrix by computing:  
(14) ijij
ij
j
A
PR
A
= ∑   
where,  gives the probability that land beginning in use i will end up in use j.   ijPR
 
Table 2. Example of Land Transition Matrix of Land Use for 1992 – 1997 
   To j   
  Crop Forest Pasture Other 1992 total 
From Crop ACC ACF ACP ACO Σj ACj
I Forest AFC AFF AFP AFO Σj AFj
 Pasture APC APF APP APO Σj APj
 Other AOC AOF AOP AOO Σj AOj
 1997 total Σi AiC Σi AiF Σi AiP Σi AiO  
 
Note: Aij is acres that land use i is converted to land use j.  Reading to the right or left of this number are 
the acres that were lost to another use by 1997, and reading up or down from this number are the acres that 
were gained from another use by 1997. 
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The full Markov transition matrix associated with Table 2 is that given in Table 
3.  As defined above this matrix gives the transition during a time period.  Such a period 
may involve multiple years (5 years here) and our framework requires the annual 
transition rate. 
In order to find annual transition rate, we need to develop one-step or one-year 
transition probability matrix from multiple-step or multiple-year transition matrix.  The 
n-step transition probability matrix can be obtained by computing the nth power of the 
one-step transition probability matrix (Chapter 15 in Hiller and Lieberman).  The matrix 
of n-step transition probabilities, , can be obtained from the expression: ( )nM
(15)  ( )n n= ⋅ =M M M M ML
where, M  is the one-step transition probability matrix. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Example of Markov Transition Matrix of Land Use for 1992 – 1997 
 
   To j   
  Crop Forest Pasture Other 1992 total 
From Crop PRCC PRCF PRCP PRCO 1.0 
I Forest PRFC PRFF PRFP PRFO 1.0 
 Pasture PRPC PRPF PRPP PRPO 1.0 
 Other PROC PROF PROP PROO 1.0 
 
Note: Pij is the probability that land use i is converted to land use j.  Reading to the right or left of this 
number are the probability that were lost to another use by 1997, and reading up or down from this number 
are the probability that were gained from another use by 1997. 
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The one-step transition probability matrix can be found using the nth roots of n-
step Markov transition matrix and can be found with numerical program such as GAMS 
by minimizing the deviations between the fifth power of a matrix and the observed 5-
year transition.   
Once we find the one-step transition probability matrix, then annual conversion 
rates for land use i to j, CRij, can be constructed as:   
(16)  ij ijCR PR=
where, CRij is the annual proportional land conversion rate from use i to use j, and PRij is 
the (i, j) element in the one-step transition probability matrix, M.  In turn, given the 
conversion rate data, the additionality discount can be found using above equations. 
Econometric Model of Land Uses 
An econometric approach employing the, so-called, land use share model can be used to 
provide a baseline prediction of the land use change rate.  Land use share models have 
been widely used for various purposes in the past by, for example, Lichtenberg; Stavins 
and Jaffe; Wu and Segerson; Hardie and Parks; Miller and Plantinga; Ahn, Plantinga and 
Alig; and Plantinga and Wu. 
The key hypothesis behind the land use share model is that land use patterns are 
determined by relative rents and land characteristics such as location and soil fertility 
(Miller and Plantinga).  The most common approach is to specify the county land use 
shares as a function of explanatory variables that include land rents from alternative 
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uses, relevant policy variables, and land quality measures.  Following section include 
mathematical formation of land-share model. 
 
Land-Share Model 
We assume that land manager mj (mj = 1, 2, …, Mj) in region j (j = 1, 2, …, J) 
maximizes expected profits from use k (k = 1, 2, …, K).  The profit function is denoted 
πk(x(t, mj), ak(t, mj), mj) where x(t, mj) is a vector of exogenous prices, costs and other 
economic variables, ak(t, mj) is the area of land of quality l devoted to use k, at time t.   
For each land quality type, assume the land manager selects the area of land 
allocated to each use ak(t, mj) ≥ 0 to maximize total profits for each q where profits are 
given by (Wu and Segerson; Miller and Plantinga): 
(17) ( ( , ), ( , ), )k j k j
k
jx t m a t m mπ∑  
subject to 
(18)  ( , ) ( , )k j
k
a t m A t m=∑ j
)j
where, A(t, mj) is the total available area of land. 
The Kuhn–Tucker solution to equations (17) and (18) is the optimal allocation 
, and the optimal share of total land 
allocate to use k is: 
* ( ( , ), ( , ),k j ja x t m A t m m ∑=
j
jjj mtAmtA ),(),(  
(19) *1( ( , ), , ) ( ( , ), ( , ), )
( , )k j j k j jjj
jf X t m t m a x t m A t m mA t m
= ∑ .    
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Given that the optimal shares are implicitly determined by land quality factors 
embedded in the profit functions, we denote each fk as a function of the X(t, mj) which 
includes the economic decision variables as well as composite measures of land quality. 
In practice, the actual share of land allocated to use k by land manager mj,  
(20) ),(),),,((),( jkjjkjk mtumtmtXfmts +=  
may differ from the optimal share due to exogenous shocks that occur after land use 
decisions have been made2.  Thus, we need to incorporate an error term, uk(t,mj), in 
equation (20).  We will assume that the errors exhibit mean zero disturbances and that 
they are contemporaneously correlated across uses and may be correlated across time 
and regions.  Also we assume that the errors are uncorrelated with the decision variables.  
Given that the actual and optimal shares sum to one, and the error term sum to zero, that 
is,  ∑ =
k
jk mtu 0),( .
Individual-specific observations of land use are not widely available, but data on 
aggregate land use are published3.  The observed share of land allocated to use k in 
region (county) j may be assembled as: 
(21) )()],(),([),(),(
1
tvmtvmtsmtwjty kjkjk
M
m
jk
j
j
++= ∑
=
 
),(),( jtjtp kk ε+=  
 
                                                 
2 For example, poor weather 
3 Data on aggregate land use are published by federal and state agencies.  In general, the aggregate land 
statistics are compiled from census or survey of individual allocation decisions. 
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If the statistics are based on a complete enumeration of the population, w(t, mj) is 
the relative share of land in region j that is managed by individual mj, and vk(t, mj) is the 
potential sampling error associated with each observation.  If the data are compiled 
through a sample survey, w(t, mj) represents the sample weight assigned to individual mj 
and )(tvk is the aggregate sampling error.  The composite error term ),( jtε  is a random 
K vector with a mean-variance structure similar to that of u(t, j). 
With respect to the sampling distribution of the aggregate data, we interpret 
 as the expected share of land in region j allocated to use k at time t.  By 
substitution of equation (20) into equation (21), we can see that  is a function of 
the complete set of economic decision variables and land quality factors
),( jtpk
),( jtpk
4. 
The expected shares are typically estimated by a censored regression approach 
following the qualitative choice literature because pk(t, j) is between zero to one  (Ben-
Akiva, and Lerman) where the logistic transformation as follows is common: 
(22) 
∑ ′
′= K
k
k
k
k
jtX
jtXjtp
)),(exp(
)),(exp(),(
β
β  
where, βk is a vector of parameters.   
 
                                                 
4 As Miller and Plantinga discuss, individual-specific information is rarely available and researchers often 
employ county-level averages X(t, j), which may include relevant proxy variables for the land quality 
characteristics of the county. 
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Equation (22) can be modified by taking the logarithm of the observed shares and 
normalizing on y1(t, j) (Judge et al.):  
(23) 1 1ln( ( , ) / ( , )) ( , ) ( , )k ky t j y t j X t j X t jβ β′ ′= −  
where, yk(t, j) is the observed land shares in region j in time t as discussed above.  The 
parameters are normalized by setting 1 0β ′ =  and can be consistently estimated by least 
squares5. 
 
Estimation of Land Conversion Rate 
From equation (23), estimates of the conversion rate, CRkj can be obtained from the 
model coefficients because total differentiation of equation (23) indicates that the model 
coefficients measure the percentage change in the share ratios for a one-unit change in 
the independent variables.  In other words, everything else constant, a one-unit change in 
the projected area explanatory variable increases or decreases the ratio of other crop or 
forestland by estimated coefficients (Ahn, Plantinga, and Alig). 
This approach is attractive because statistical tests are possible and landowners’ 
behavior can be explained with economic theory.  Also we estimate βk, then we can 
calculate the percent change in land share for the future and examine conversion rate.  
However, there is need to find the future values of the explanatory variables.  Also, the 
 
                                                 
5 The number of relevant economic and land quality variables may be larger than the available sample 
size, and unique estimates of county-specific model parameters cannot be computed by least squares.  In 
such cases, researchers combine data for many counties and estimate a pooled regression model with 
cross-county parameter restrictions (Miller and Plantinga). 
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projected area assumed to be converted to other land uses in a proportional fashion 
regardless of stock level and this assumption may be unrealistic.   
Concluding Remarks 
AO offsets need to be additional to the baseline.  In an AO project, additionality is 
concerned when the region where a project is being proposed has had substantial 
adoption of the AO practice before any GHG programs were implemented, and this 
adoption is expected to continue.  In such a case, a discount for the region may need to 
reflect business-as-usual AO practice adoption. 
Estimate of the additionality discount is important because the credit buyers and 
the government agency or regulatory agency assure the GHGE credits paid for are in fact 
additional.  When the additionality discount is positive, the claimable GHGE credit 
would decrease.  
In order to estimate the additionality discount, we need to investigate individual 
producer’s profit structure and in turn, marginal cost schedule for offsetting GHGE. 
Also, we need to have information for producer’s type but there exists an asymmetric 
information problem that will cause some biases when we measure the additionality 
discount.  The asymmetric information problem cannot be overcome at a reasonable 
cost.   
We propose a project-based approach, that is, we assume that all of producers in 
the region adopt the AO project when the GHGE credit price is greater than equal to 
their marginal cost.  Based on the distribution of producer type we can project the 
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GHGE offset.  In this case, we need estimates of land use transitions to compute baseline 
GHGE offset.  For doing this, we can utilize the Markov transition matrix and/or an 
econometric approach in the form of the land share model. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ESTIMATE OF LEAKAGE DISCOUNT 
Background 
When an AO project succeeds, it potentially reduces the supply of agricultural production 
on the project area.  In the competitive agricultural markets are likely that additional 
supply will arise from production outside of the project area, with accompanied increasing 
GHGE.  To the extent that this happens, the AO project based GHG offset leaks. 
In other words, actions to reduce net GHGE may alter current or anticipated 
production levels; in turn creating alterations in market conditions (e.g. price effects) 
that can induce emission increases elsewhere (Murray, McCarl and Lee).  Because 
agricultural markets are highly competitive and demand curve is relatively inelastic, 
leakage effects may be substantial.  In this case, the GHG offset gains for which one can 
claim credits should be discounted by the amount of leakage.  
For example, suppose that in a region a significant amount of cropland is 
converted into pasturelands in the name of an AO program.  In turn, that conversion 
would lower production and raise prices stimulating producers in other regions to try to 
meet the associated market shortage.  That reaction could involve developing croplands 
from pasturelands, forestlands or wetlands all of which would cause additional GHGE. 
Empirical studies on leakage can be found in the economics literature on 
investment crowding or slippage effects in agricultural conservation programs or U.S. 
crop commodity programs.  Lee, Kaiser and Alig examine U.S. tree planting programs 
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and support a crowding-out effects for government subsidized tree planting versus 
private tree planting.  Wu examines the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and finds 
that about 20% of the acres diverted from production were replaced by other acreage 
with 9 to 14% of the environmental benefits offset.  Brooks, Aradhyula and Johnson and 
Hoag, Babcock and Foster investigate the leakage effect in U.S. crop commodity 
programs and provide evidence of offsetting responses by producers.   
Regarding afforestation policy, Murray, McCarl and Lee estimate that the 
leakage would be 43% to 58% under a policy for federal timber restrictions to sequester 
carbon in the U.S. Pacific-Northwest area.  And they show that leakage can be estimated 
by a formula involving market parameters such as price elasticities, and market shares.  
Lee et al. (2000) shows unilateral U.S. implementation of an agriculturally based GHGE 
offset program leads to a decline in U.S. agricultural exports and an increase in 
production in the rest of the world, which is indicative of leakage.   
The purpose of this chapter is to further examine the concept of leakage in an 
economic sense and develop an economic measure of leakage.   
Graphical Analysis and Justification for Leakage 
Leakage occurs to the extent that the GHGE saved in a project area is offset by a market 
driven increase in GHGE outside of the project area.  The project area is the area where 
the AO project is put into effect, and the outside area is the rest of the world.  When the 
AO project causes project area production to fall then the total supply of output will 
decrease.  In turn this causes output price to rise under a ceteris paribus assumption.  
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This rise in output price stimulates producers outside the project area to increase 
output.  When additional net GHGE outside of the project area are zero then there is no 
leakage effect and when the added GHGE is the same as that in the project area, there is 
a 100% leakage effect.    
Suppose that there are two identical regions that produce crops.  In other words, 
there are two crop suppliers in the market: 
(24) ( , )Proj Proj C ProjS S P W=  
(25)  ( , )Out Out C OutS S P W=
where, the  subscript Proj represents production in the “Project Area” which is targeted 
by the AO program and the subscript Out represents production “Outside of the project 
area”.  SProj and SOut give the quantity of the crop supplied by the two parties while PC 
gives the price of the crop and W the input price vector.   
Now assume the aggregate demand function for the crop is:  
(26)  ( , )CD D P Z=
where, D is the quantity of crops consumed, and Z is a vector of demand shifters such as 
income and prices of substitute commodities.  Market equilibrium equates supply and 
demand: 
(27)   * *( , ) ( , ) ( , )Proj C Proj Out C Out CS P W S P W D P Z+ = *
where equilibrium crop price is . *CP
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It is helpful to derive the excess demand for supply facing area Out, which is the 
difference between total demand and the supply by area Proj.  The excess demand for 
area Out can be defined as follows6: 
(28) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , )C Proj Proj ProjED P Z W D P Z S P W= −  
Inserting equation (28) into the equilibrium condition in equation (27), then the 
equilibrium for area Out can be found:  
(29)  * *( , ) ( , , )Out C Out C ProjS P W ED P Z W=
Such a market is illustrated in Figure 4 where the excess demand function for 
area Out, ED0, is the difference between the total demand function D in panel (a) and the 
supply function  in panel (b).  The equilibrium price is , the amount produced in 
area Out is , in area Proj is , and the total amount produced and consumed is 
.  Correspondingly, the land usage for crop cultivation in area Out is 
 and in area Proj is  from the production function in Panel (d) and (e).  Total 
land usage is . 
0
ProjS
0
CP
0
OutQ
0
ProjQ
0 0 0
Out ProjQ Q Q= +
0
OutL
0
ProjL
0 0 0
Out ProjL L L= +
Suppose that the AO program makes producers discontinue crop cultivation and 
plant trees through afforestation.  In such a case, supply from the project area Proj will 
decrease (to zero) as shown in panel (b) in Figure 4, and the excess demand faced by 
producers in area Out rises.   
 
                                                 
6 The idea of the excess demand is introduced here based on Murray, McCarl and Lee. 
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       Figure 4.  Output market and land use change 
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This is illustrated in Figure 4 by a rightward shift in Out’s excess demand 
function from ED0 to ED1 or D.  The demand shift causes producers’ response which 
could increase emissions and thus offset part of project gains illustrates the leakage 
effect.  
The rightward shift in Out’s demand function disrupts the initial price/quantity 
equilibrium. In order for the market to clear again, the output price will rise and will 
induce more supply into the market from additional production in the non-project area.   
The new equilibrium is reached at ( ) and .1,CP Q
1 1 1
OutQ Q=   The supply from the 
area Out expands from  to .  At the new equilibrium, the land usage in area Out 
is .  The increase in land allocation raises the potential for leakage by the price-
induced supply response. 
0
OutQ
1
OutQ
1
OutL
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       Figure 5. GHGE offset and leakage effects 
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The leakage effect under the assumption of equal emissions per acre is illustrated 
in Figure 5.  The GHGE offset in the project area is AO0 but the increase in land usage in 
the unrestricted area increases their GHGE offset by AO1.  The leakage can be defined as 
the distance between AO0 and AO1 in Figure 5. 
Derivation of Leakage Discount 
In this section, a formula for a leakage discount (LEAK) is derived.  Most of 
development is similar to that in Murray, McCarl and Lee.  However, there are two 
important differences: (i) the leakage discount developed here is for leakage in terms of 
input usage change (especially land) not output change so that we need one more 
parameter giving the change in output per unit change in inputs (we will call it the input 
elasticity from now on), , and (ii) the leakage discount developed here considers 
land conversion into multiple alternate uses and the accompanying leakage from 
multiple sources.  
inputE
Leakage in Single Land Use 
Conceptually, the leakage discount can be defined as follows:  
(30) 0(%) 100
Out Out
Proj Proj
L SRLEAK
L SR
∆ ⋅= ×⋅  
where,  is changes in area Out’s land allocation to crop, which is defined as 
 and SR is the per acre net GHGE offset rate in area i, and  is the 
project area.   The denominator can be interpreted as the total amount of GHGE offset by 
the AO project in the Proj area, (that is, Q in equation (1) in Chapter II) and the 
OutL∆
1 0
Out Out OutL L L∆ = − 0ProjL
 47
 
numerator is the amount of GHGE leaked outside of the project area (that is, Q – QC in 
equation (1) in Chapter II).   
If net AO offset rates (SR) are the same in each area, the leakage can be 
expressed by the ratio of the changes in land use OutL∆  to  but this is likely not the 
case.  Thus to estimate the leakage discount, we need to predict or measure , , 
and 
0
ProjL
OutL∆ OutSR
ProjSR , and with known  that is the size of the project area.     
0
ProjL
Suppose the input elasticity with respect to land is , which is defined as 
follows:  
inputE
(31) 
0
0
S
input
LQE
L Q
∆≡ ⋅∆   
where,  is the changes in quantities supplied.  Then using equation (31), , can 
be found as follows: 
SQ∆ OutL∆
(32) 00
1 SOut
Out Out
input Out
QL L
E Q
∆∆ = ⋅  
Initial supply from area Out, , initial land use, , and the input elasticity 
for land, , are observable but .  This supply change can be found in the 
market.  The change in excess demand for the producers in the area Out can be 
expressed as follows: 
0
OutQ
0
OutL
inputE
S
OutQ∆
(33) 0 0 0( ) CProj D Out Proj
C
PED Q E Q Q
P
∆∆ = + +  
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where, ∆ED is the change in excess demand facing area Out,  is the baseline market 
quantity of area Proj, 
0
ProjQ
DE  is the price elasticity of demand, and  is the market price.  
The first term on the right hand side reflects the outward shift in Out’s demand given the 
removal of supply from area Proj, and the second term reflects how consumers respond 
to the market price change. 
CP
If we introduce a scale parameter which is defined as to remove 
 from equation (33), then equation (33) would be modified as follows: 
0 /Proj OutQ Qφ = 0
0
ProjQ
(34) 0 0(1 ) Cinput Out D input Out
C
PED E Q E E Q
P
φ φ ∆∆ = + +  
where,  is the baseline market quantity of area Out, 0OutQ φ is the scale parameter and 
 is the input elasticity of land changes.  InputE
The changes in supply by producers in the area Out is, 
(35) 0S COut S Out
C
PQ E Q
P
∆∆ =  
where,  is the price elasticity of supply.  SE
Setting equations (34) and (35) equal to each other and solving for the 
proportional change in the equilibrium price gives: 
(36) 
(1 )
InputC
C S D Input
EP
P E E E
φ
φ
∆ = − +  
Substituting equation (36) into equation (35) yields: 
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(37) 
(1 )
S
Input S OutS
Out
S D Input
E E Q
Q
E E E
φ
φ∆ = − +  
And substituting equation (37) into equation (32) yields: 
(38) 0
(1 )
S
Out Out
S D Input
EL L
E E E
φ
φ∆ = − +  
Using equation (38), the leakage discount can be found as a function of 
exogenous parameters as follows: 
(39) 
0
0 0(%) 100 100(1 )
Out Out S Out Out
Proj Proj S D Input Proj Proj
L SR E L SRLEAK
L SR E E E L SR
φ
φ
∆ ⋅ ⋅= × = ⋅⋅ − + ⋅ ×  
Based on equation (39), the leakage effect depends on the supply and demand 
price elasticities and the input elasticity of the land.  All else held constant, the leakage 
effect decreases when supply is more inelastic, and the leakage effect increases when 
demand is more inelastic.  Leakage increases when the input elasticity is more inelastic 
and decreases when the supply responsiveness to the land is more elastic.  Inelastic input 
elasticity implies that more land is needed to produce the same output. 
Leakage in a Multi-Land Use Context 
Leakage may occur through more than one market, ∆LOut, can involve land conversions in 
a number of different land uses such as conversion from croplands into pasture or forestry.   
For example, we could convert a significant amount of croplands into forestlands in one 
region in the name of the AO project.  In turn, that conversion would lower production 
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and raise crop prices but lower timber prices stimulating producers in other regions 
nationally or internationally to try to adjust to altered market prices.  Note that reactions 
in terms of croplands, grasslands, and forests lands involve different offset rates.  That is 
to say, the net AO offset rate in area Out, SROut, in equation (39) should be decomposed 
in order to consider these differences. 
To do this, there is need to predict land use change, and it can be done with a 
Markov model.  The Markov model can be used to find conversion rate from one land 
use to another land use (See Chapter III for more details).  In the case of leakage, the 
conversion rate may be increased due to rises in output price.  However, we assume that 
conversion rate is constant.  In turn that conversion rate can be used as a weight to find 
the leakage effect.  In other words, equation (38) can be modified as follows: 
(40) 
0
0
1
1(%) 100
(1 )
K
S Out kOut
kOut
k S D Input Out Proj Proj
E L CRLEAK SR
E E E CR L SR
φ
φ=
⎛ ⎞= ⋅⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− + ⋅⎝ ⎠∑ ×  
where, k depicts each source such as other croplands, pastureland or forests lands, SRkOut 
is the sequestration rate of alternative k, CRkOut is the (absolute value of) conversion rate 
from or to the k alternative and CROut is the total conversion rate that is defined as 
 and SR the net emission rate.    
1
K
Out kOut
t
CR CR
=
= ∑
Concluding Remarks 
When an AO project succeeds in one region, it potentially reduces regional production 
of agricultural products.  Markets may react by encouraging additional production and 
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GHGE in other regions, thereby offsetting the net reduction in GHGE.  To the extent that 
this happens, the AO project-based GHGE offset leaks.  In this case, the claimable 
GHGE offset should be reduced by the induced out of region increase in GHGE.  In 
other words, leakage reduces the salable quantity of GHGE offset.  
In this chapter, we derived the leakage discount formula as a function of 
exogenous market parameters including price elasticities and input elasticity.  The 
leakage effect may be substantial because both demand and supply elasticities are 
typically inelastic for agricultural products.  In the case of the AO project, it is important 
to identify the variety of land use management pattern changes elsewhere and offset 
consequences.  In turn, we propose using weights which are calculated based on 
conversion rates and the net AO offset rates. 
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CHAPTER V 
ESTIMATE OF PERMANENCE DISCOUNT 
Background 
An AO project, mainly involving carbon sequestration, can contribute to societal GHG 
mitigation, but has the characteristic that the sequestered carbon is not necessarily 
permanent.  Namely, once the AO project is put into place, the realized soil carbon gains 
are stored in a volatile form and the annual rate of carbon gains are not the same over time.   
In particular, the soil carbon content reaches a new equilibrium where 
accumulation stops (West and Post), and agricultural soil sequestration from tillage 
changes can be expected to peak in 5 to 10 years, reaching a new equilibrium in 15 to 20 
years in the case of agricultural soil carbon sequestration (West and Post).  In the forestry 
case, soil and standing tree carbon reach equilibrium by year 80 for un-harvested 
southeastern U.S. pine stands (Birdsey).  Furthermore, when the AO practice is 
discontinued, most of carbon is released quickly to the atmosphere and the system 
reverts back to the pre-AO practice equilibrium (IPCC). 
This situation contrasts with the case of most direct emission reductions which 
represent permanent removals of GHG from the atmosphere, even if the emission 
reductions activities are of a limited duration.  Thus, saturation and volatility in the AO 
sequestration projects introduce additional considerations since these permanence 
characteristics can change the GHGE credits generated by the AO project.  These 
considerations lead to a permanence discount.  Conceptually, a permanence discount 
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involves a comparison between permanent removals of GHG with temporal storage of 
GHG, which can be released (accidentally or on purpose) to the atmosphere in the future. 
The following section presents more details on permanence, and volatility and 
develops a permanence discount.  Also, it is important to consider the future value of 
carbon storage when we calculate the permanence discount because time horizons in 
equation (4) in Chapter II are different.  Finally we extend the concept developing a 
permanence discount into the multiple GHGE offset case. 
Analytical Approach for Permanence 
Conceptual Permanence Discount 
Suppose that a firm (or government) wants to purchase GHGE credits under an AO 
sequestration program.  Based on the saturation year, the AO project can be divided as: 
(i) adoption of reduced tillage or conversion to other crops or pasturelands that is likely 
to saturate after 20 years and (ii) conversion to forestry (afforestation) that is likely to 
saturate 80 or more years. 
Sequestered carbon will be released to the atmosphere in the future if the AO 
practice is discontinued or some disturbances such as wildfire or pest outbreaks occur.  
These dynamic permanence considerations imply that the comparison of sequestration 
methods should adjust for the time value of emissions offsets and possible future 
emissions.  In this case, GHGE credit would be given for the number of tons of carbon 
held out of the atmosphere for a given number of years (Marland, Fruit, and Sedjo).  
This is the concept of a permanence discount.   
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We define the permanence discount as one minus the ratio of the benefit gained 
from carbon sequestration while carbon is stored compared to the benefit gained if the 
sequestration was permanent as pointed out in Chapter II.  Here, we can use a ton-year 
accounting to compute permanence discounts. 
Equivalence Time and Ton-Year Accounting 
A ton-year accounting approach is used to compare activities that sequester (or release) 
carbon for different lengths of.  Under a ton-year accounting carbon sequestration is 
valued on the basis of both the number of tons sequestered and years over which it is 
sequestered (Noble et al.).  The concept of a ton-year accounting has been discussed in 
many studies (Fearnside, 1995, 1997; Moura-Costa, 1996; Chomitz, 1998; Tipper and de 
Jong). 
The ton-year accounting converts the climatic effect of temporal carbon storage 
to an equivalent amount of (current) permanent removal of carbon (Dobes, Enting, and 
Maskin; Tipper and de Jong).  This factor is derived from the equivalence time (Te) 
concept (Moura-Costa, 1996), that is, the length of time that CO2 must be stored as 
carbon in biomass or soil for it to prevent the cumulative radiative forcing effect exerted 
by a similar amount of CO2 during its residence in the atmosphere.   
The equivalence time is defined as ton-years/Te = permanent tons.  The basic 
question is how long carbon must be sequestered to be equivalent to permanent emission 
reduction (IPCC).  The choice of Te is important because the value of sequestration is 
completely determined by the choice of Te (Herzog, Caldeira and Reilly).   
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Alternative methodologies have been proposed to generate this equivalence time 
parameter. Tipper and de Jong base their calculations on the difference between current 
atmospheric concentrations and the pre-industrial equilibrium concentration of CO2 to 
derive a carbon storage period (Te) of 42–50 years following initial sequestration. 
Chomitz (1998) propose similar ranges 50 years.  Dobes, Enting, and Maskin calculates 
Te = 150 years. 
In this study, we use Te = 100 years.  The rationale for the 100-year time horizon 
is based on the argument that the problem of comparing carbon storage of different 
lifetimes is conceptually equivalent to comparing GHG of different lifetimes.  This 
comparison has already been addressed in the construction of Global Warming Potential 
(GWP), where the GHW measures adopted in the Kyoto Protocol are based on a 100-
year horizon (IPCC; Fearnside; Fearnside, Lashof and Moura-Costa). 
Permanence Discount Based on Ton-Year Accounting 
Under the ton-year accounting system, credit would be awarded for the number of tons 
of carbon held out of the atmosphere for a given number of years.  For example, under 
an assumption of constant atmospheric CO2 burden, the certain carbon sequestration 
project sequesters 1 ton of CO2 in year zero (one time sequestration) and holds it for 100 
years, then this project provides 100 ton-years and gains full credits.  In other words, this 
project is regarded as a permanent emission reduction and thus, permanence discount 
should be zero. 
If all of the carbon sequestered in year zero is released to the atmosphere in year 
50, then this project provides only 50 ton-years.  This project gains only 50% of full 
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credit and permanence discount is simply estimated as 50% (1 – 50 ton-years/100 ton-
years) based on equation (1) in Chapter II.   
It is noteworthy here that the effect or atmospheric CO2 burden is not constant 
over time.  According to Joos et al., the effect is decaying over time based on the carbon 
cycle model.  Joos et al. give a function for this decay and denote it F(t) 7.  If we use this 
carbon burden model, sequestration of 1 ton of CO2 in year zero with its removal for the 
full 100 years reduces the atmospheric CO2 burden by  ton-years (not 
100 ton-years).  Also if all of the carbon sequestered in year zero is released to the 
atmosphere in year 50, the reduction in atmospheric CO
100
0
( ) 46.4F t dt ≈∫
2 burden is ton-
years (not 50 ton-years).  Thus, this project would gain 61% of the permanent offset and 
the permanence discount is simply estimated as 39% (= 1 – 28.2 ton-years/46.4 ton-
years).  This is illustrated in Figure 6. 
50
0
( ) 28.2F t dt ≈∫
Panel (A) depicts the permanent reduction of 1 ton of CO2 for 100 years and 
Panel (B) depicts the carbon sequestration of 1 ton of CO2 in year zero and followed by 
emission of 1 ton of CO2 in year 50.  The reduction in atmospheric burden is calculated 
as the area of under the curve in each Panel. 
 
                                                 
7 F(t) = 0.1756 + 0.1375 exp(-t/421.09) + 0.1858 exp(-t/70.60) + 0.2423 exp(-t/21.42) + 0.2589 exp(-
t/3.42), where F is the fraction of CO2 remaining in the atmosphere or changes in atmospheric CO2 
burden. 
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 Panel A. Permanent reduction of 1 ton of CO2 for 100 years 
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 Panel B. Sequestration of 1 ton of CO2 for 50 years and followed emission 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Reductions in atmospheric burden from removal of 1 ton of CO2 in year 
zero and followed by emission in year 50 
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The more interesting case is that the AO sequestration project sequesters 1 ton of 
CO2 in every year until saturation after reaching equilibrium (assume that it occurs in year 
50).  After saturation, if this project is discontinued, then suppose the sequestered carbon is 
released to the atmosphere immediately (it is assumed to occur within one year).   
This case is illustrated in Figure 7.  Panel (A) in Figure 7 shows permanent 
removal of 1 ton of CO2 in the first 50 years and holds the carbon forever (100 years), 
and Panel (B) shows sequestration of 1 ton of CO2 in the first 50 years and these are 
released to the atmosphere in year 50.   
In this case, the permanent reduction reduces the atmospheric CO2 burden by 
 ≈ 1919.4 ton-years.  On the other hand, the carbon sequestration 
alternative which releases the carbon in year 50 reduces atmospheric CO
( )100 100 
0
( )
t
t
F t dt
=
∑ ∫
2 burden by 
 ≈ 824.5 ton-years.  Thus, this project gains only 43% of the permanent 
offset and the permanence discount is simply estimated as 57%. 
( )50 50 
0
( )
t
t
F t dt
=
∑ ∫
Permanence Discount Coupled with Time Value 
The objective of ton-year accounting is to determine the environmental value of GHG 
mitigation projects based on the amount of sequestered carbon and the duration of 
carbon storage.  Thus, the ton-year accounting does not have economic considerations in 
it.  However, because GHGE reductions in the future are not worth the same as equal 
reductions are today, a calculation of permanence discount should be made under the 
economic considerations (Richards; Herzog, Caldeira, and Reilly; Moura-Costa, 2002; 
Ferarnside, Lashof, and Moura-Costa). 
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Figure 7. Reductions in atmospheric CO2 burden from 50-year sequestration and 
followed by emissions of all in year 50 
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 The rationale for an economic approach is discussed in Chapter I and Chapter II.  
When a buyer forms a long-run investment portfolio, the AO project will be compared 
with other mitigation options and this implies that consideration of explicit carbon price 
(path) and interest rate is important because time horizons in equation (5) in Chapter II 
are different8.   
Suppose that we calculate the permanence discount based on the net present value 
(NPV) concept.  In that case the NPV of benefits of a permanent carbon reduction is: 
(41)  ( )100 100 
0
( ) ( ) ( )PM rt
t
t
NPV e P t Q t F t dt−
=
= ∑ ∫
where, P(t) is the carbon price in time t, Q(t) is the quantity of sequestered carbon in 
time t, r is the appropriate interest rate.  Note that the superscript PM indicates 
permanent GHGE reduction.  Also, we define the NPV of the benefits from a carbon 
sequestration followed emission in year ST: 
(42)  ( ) 
0
( ) ( ) ( )
ST STTM rt
t
t
NPV e P t Q t F t dt−
=
= ∑ ∫
where, the superscript TM indicates temporal GHGE storage.  From equations (41) and 
(42), we can define the permanence discount (PERM) as follows: 
(43)  (%) 1 100
TM
PMPERM NPV
NPV= − ×⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
 
                                                 
8 Recall equation (5) in Chapter II: ( )10(%) 1 100NPVNPVδ = − × .  
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Suppose that there is a carbon sequestration project with a duration 50 years 
exemplified above section.  Assume that carbon price is $1/ton and constant over time 
for simplicity and the interest rate is 4%.  The permanence discount in this case can be 
found using equation (43).  Note that we assume that Q(t) = 1 ton of CO2:   
 ( )
( )
50 50 0.04
 
0
100 100 0.04
 
0
( )
266.81 100 1 100 21%
337.1( )
t
t
t
t
t
t
e F t dt
e F t dt
−
=
−
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− × ≈ − ×⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∫
∑ ∫
= .  
 
Thus, PERM is 21% and thus, this project should be given 79% of the full credit.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 8.    
Empirical Permanence Discounts for Alternative Projects 
In order to estimate the empirical magnitude of PERM discounts for alternative AO 
projects, we need additional assumptions.  Assume the following: 
o Quantity of GHGE offset, Q(t), equals 1 ton of CO2 per year until saturation, 
and zero thereafter, 
o Carbon price, P(t), is $1/ton and constant over time, 
o Time horizon, Te, is 100 years, 
o When the AO project is discontinued, all of CO2 are released to the 
atmosphere within 1 year, and 
o Interest rate is 4%. 
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Figure 8. Change in value of atmospheric CO2 burden from 50-year sequestration 
and followed by emissions of all in year 50 when carbon price is $1/ton 
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Agricultural Soil Offset 
Consider an agricultural soil offset that sequesters carbon from the atmosphere for the 
first 20 years and zero thereafter.  Agricultural producers are paid to adopt the AO 
practice for 20 years, but there are two possibilities beyond year 20.   
Case A1 is that producers revert back to previous crop cultivation after saturation 
occurs.  Subsequently, the sequestered carbon volatilizes to the atmosphere immediately. 
This is a carbon sequestration project with a duration 20 years.  In this case, PERM is 
calculated as 52.2% using equation (42).     
Case A2 is that producers maintain the AO project because of GHG payment 
keeping for full 100 years or their own best interest without GHG payment.  In such a 
case, producers hold sequestered carbon for 100 years (no volatility problem) and in 
turn, PERM is zero.   All of sequestered carbon would be given a credit (See Table 4). 
 
Afforestation 
In the case of afforestation, volatility occurs when lands revert to agricultural use after 
harvest or much of aboveground and belowground carbon is removed in the harvesting 
process.  The permanence discount calculation for afforestation is more complicated 
than agricultural soil offset because there is a need to include (i) timing of forest harvest 
(rotation type: shorter rotation or longer rotation), and (ii) whether reforestation occurs 
after harvest.  The time to saturation (80 years) and post harvest carbon profiles are 
based on Birdsey data for southeastern U.S. pine plantations.  We consider 6 cases, F1 
through F6.  Assume that all of carbon stored in wood volatilizes immediately.  
 64
 
Table 4. Agricultural Soil Offset and Permanence Discounts 
Cases Saturation Practice After PERM 
 Year (ST) Saturation Discount (%) 
A1 20 Revert 52.2 
A2 20 Maintain 0.0 
 
 
Cases F1 and F2 depict a forest kept to saturation.  Under case F1, there is no harvest 
and the stand is kept forever so that there is no possibility for reforestation and volatility. 
Under case F2, there is harvest at year 80 but reforestation is not done.  Cases F3 and F4 
are for shorter rotation forestry primarily managed for pulpwood, which are harvested at 
year 20.  Case F3 permits no reforestation after harvest, and case F4 allows reforestation 
after harvest.  Cases F5 and F6 are for longer rotation forestry primarily managed for saw 
timber, which are harvested at year 50.  Case F5 prohibits reforestation after harvest but 
case F6 allows reforestation after harvest.  
When reforestation is not allowed, we utilize equation (43) directly to compute 
the permanence discount.  However, we need to modify the NPVTM in equation (43) to 
reflect re-accumulation of carbon when reforestation is allowed.  The NPVTM is 
expanded to consider carbon re-accumulation after reforestation as follows:   
(44) , 
 
1 0
( ) ( ) ( )
n
n
RYN RYTM rt
R t
n t
NPV e P t Q t F t dt−
= =
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑∫
where, RYn is nth rotation or harvest year and subscript R indicates reforestation.   
Thus, PERM is re-defined when reforestation is allowed: 
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(45) (%) 1 100
TM
R
PM
NPVPERM
NPV
⎛ ⎞= − ×⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
 
This can be illustrated using Figure 9, which depicts the case of F4.  Case F4 is for 
shorter rotation forestry harvested at year 20 and allows reforestation after harvest.  When 
afforestation is adopted, carbon is accumulated in the first 20 years at decreasing rate.  As 
assumed above, Q(t) = 1 ton of CO2 and P(t) = $1/ton.   In year 20, most of the carbon 
sequestered is released to the atmosphere but carbon begins to accumulate again due to 
reforestation.  This is illustrated by increases in carbon accumulation after year 20.   In such 
a case, the reduction atmospheric CO2 burden is calculated by 
20 40 6020 40 600.04
   
0 20 40
80 10080 100
  
60 80
( ) ( ) ( )
               ( ) ( ) 199.4
TM t rt rt
R t t t
t t t
rt rt
t t
t t
NPV e F t dt e F t dt e F t dt
e F t dt e F t dt
− − −
= = =
− −
= =
= + +
+ ≈
∑ ∑ ∑∫ ∫ ∫
∑ ∑∫ ∫
+
 
 
Based on above discussion, the permanence discounts for afforestation are estimated 
as follows.  Under F1, PERM is zero because sequestered carbon is not released during 100 
years.  The salable GHGE offset can be given full credits.  Under case F2, there is harvest at 
year 80 but reforestation is not allowed then PERM is computed as 5.7%.  Cases F3 and 
F4 are harvested at year 20.  Case F3 permits no reforestation after harvest.  In this case, 
PERM is 52.2%.  Case F4 allows reforestation after harvest and PERM decreases to 
29.5%.  Cases F5 and F6 are harvested at year 50.  Case F5 prohibits reforestation after 
harvest.  In this case, PERM is 20.8%.  Case F6 allows reforestation after harvest and 
PERM is 16.4% (See Table 5).   
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Figure 9. Change in value of atmospheric CO2 burden from F4 project 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 5, all of permanence discounts are positive when volatility 
occurs, and it implies that salable GHGE offsets decrease.  It is noteworthy that shorter 
rotation forestry management option has the larger permanence discounts.  Also, if 
volatility does not occur because the AO project is kept maintaining and holding carbon, 
then PERM would be zero and producers will be able to claim full credits. 
Permanence Discount under Multiple GHGE Offset  
The above discussion is limited to carbon sequestration while the AO project could also 
involve other GHGE offsets such as reductions in emission of CO2, methane (CH4) and 
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nitrous oxide (N2O).  For example, reducing rice cultivation in favor of tree planting also 
reduces emissions of CH4 to the atmosphere9.   
 Thus, an AO project which converts rice lands to other croplands or forestlands 
should consider saved CH4 emissions.  Also, when producers adopt no-till as the AO 
project, they can reduce fuel usage for machinery so that CO2 can be saved.  Note that 
theses emissions reductions are permanent.  Thus, Q by the AO project can be 
decomposed into two components as follows: 
(46) , ( ) ( ) ( )Q t CE t OE t= +
 
 
Table 5.  Afforestation and Permanence Discounts 
Cases  Saturation Harvest Reforest PERM 
  Year Age after Discount 
    Harvest (%) 
F1 Forest kept 80 Never  0.0 
F2 to saturation 80 80 No 5.7 
      
F3 Shorter 80 20 No 52.2 
F4 rotation 80 20 Yes 29.5 
      
F5 Longer 80 50 No 20.8 
F6 rotation 80 50 Yes 16.4 
 
                                                 
9 Rice cultivation is a small source of methane in U.S.  In 1999, methane emissions from rice cultivation 
were about 2 percent of total U.S. methane emissions (EPA 2001).  However, the amount of methane 
reduction is substantial on a per acre basis.  Based on empirical analysis in subsequent chapters, reduced 
methane is estimated about 0.76 tons carbon equivalent and it is equivalently 25 percent of total GHG 
offset in case of afforestation and over 70 percent of the emission offset by a tillage change. 
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where, CE(t) is (temporal) carbon sequestration in time t and OE(t) is other permanent 
GHGE reductions such as removed CH4, N2O or CO2.  It is important here that OE(t) is 
permanent or is not reversed when producers revert their land management or land use to 
pre-AO project.  
The NPV of the benefits from the AO project followed emission in year ST in 
equation (43) changed to: 
(47)   ( ) 100  
0
( )( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ST STTM rt rt
M t ST
t
NPV e P t CE t OE t F t dt e P t OE t F t dt− −
=
= + +∑ ∫ ∫
where, the subscript M indicates multiple GHGE offset.  Using equation (47), PERM is 
modified as follows: 
(48) (%) 1 100
TM
M
PMPERM NPV
NPV= − ×⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
 
For illustrational purposes, assume that CE(t) and OE(t) are 0.7 tons of CO2 and 
0.3 tons of CO2 respectively in case of agricultural soil carbon sequestration.  In this 
case, PERM decreases relative to the single offset (carbon sequestration) case, because 
the MTMNPV  increases due to permanent GHGE offset, OE(t).  In other words, in year 20, 
the AO project saturates and is reverted back to intensive tillage or the previous land use 
then volatility occurs.  However, only the sequestered carbon, CE(t), would be released 
to the atmosphere, so that the increase in burden to the atmosphere is reduced compared 
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to single offset case.  This is illustrated in Figure 10.  The area of the curve after ST year 
shows the NPV for permanent GHGE offset, OE(t). 
Case A1 is that agricultural producers revert back to conventional tillage or 
previous crop cultivation after saturation occurs.  In this case, PERM is calculated as 
22.6% while it is 52.2% for the single offset case.  Under case A2, the agricultural 
producers maintain the AO project to save GHG so that PERM is again zero (See 
Table 6). 
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     Figure 10. Change in value of atmospheric CO2 burden under multiple GHGE 
offset 
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Table 6. Agricultural Soil Offset and Permanence Discounts under Multi Offset 
Cases Saturation Practice After PERM 
 Year Saturation Discount (%) 
A1 20 Revert 22.6 
A2 20 Maintain 0.0 
Note: we assume that carbon sequestration and permanent GHG offset are 0.7 tons of CO2 and 0.3 tons of 
CO2, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
In the case of afforestation, suppose CE(t) is 0.8 tons while OE(t) is 0.2 tons of 
CO2.  Cases F1 and F2 are a forest kept to saturation.  Under the case F1 with no harvest, 
PERM is zero.  Under the case F2 with harvest at year 80 and without reforestation, PERM 
is computed as 3.2% compared with 5.7% for the single offset.  Cases F3 and F4 are for 
shorter rotation with harvests in year 20.  Under the case F3 without reforestation after 
harvest, PERM is 32.5% compared with 52.2% for the single offset.  Under the case F4 
with reforestation, PERM is 9.7% while it is 29.5% for the single offset.  Cases F5 and F6 
are for longer rotation with harvest at year 50.  Under the case F5 without reforestation, 
PERM is 11.9% compared with 20.8% for the single offset.  Under the case F6 with 
reforestation, PERM is 7.4% while it is 16.4% for the single offset case (See Table 7).   
Concluding Remarks 
Once an AO project involving soil sequestration is put into place, soil carbon begins to 
accumulate until it reaches a new equilibrium whereupon the absorptive capacity of the 
soil is used up and the soil saturates.  In the case of crops, the saturation year is around 
20 and forestry saturation year is greater than 80. 
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Table 7.  Afforestation and Permanence Discounts Under Multi Offset Case 
Cases  Saturation Harvest Reforest Perm 
  Year Age after Discount 
    Harvest (%) 
F1 Forest kept 80 Never  0.0 
F2 to saturation 80 80 No 3.2 
      
F3 Shorter 80 20 No 32.5 
F4 rotation 80 20 Yes 9.7 
      
F5 Longer 80 50 No 11.9 
F7 rotation 80 50 Yes 7.4 
 
Note: we assume that carbon sequestration is 0.8 tons of CO2 and permanent GHG offset is 0.2 tons of 
CO2. 
 
 
 
 
Basically, the AO project is no different than other GHGE mitigation options 
such as direct emission reductions from the GHGE credit buyer’s point of a view except 
that the carbon may not last as long.  Thus, as other long-run investment portfolio, the 
AO project should be compared with other mitigation options and this means that a 
permanence discount calculation should be made based on the duration over which the 
carbon is held, the price of carbon and the appropriate interest rate. 
In the above material, a formula for computation of permanence discounts is 
developed and applied.  Empirically, example permanence discounts are computed.  
Most of the case, permanence discounts are found to be positive, which implies that the 
salable quantities of GHGE offset is less than that of a permanent offset.   
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When the AO sequestration project also involves permanent GHGE reductions as 
well as sequestration (multiple GHGE offset), the average permanence discount is 
reduced, and thus, the salable equivalent GHGE offset increases. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ESTIMATE OF UNCERTAINTY DISCOUNT 
Background 
There are a variety of uncertainties related to an AO project.  Uncertainty here is the 
term to describe phenomena such as statistical variability, lack of knowledge or surprise 
with respect to the quantity of GHGE offsets produced (Morgan and Henrion; Hattis and 
Burmaster, Cullen and Frey; Heath and Smith).  Uncertainties can make place decision 
makers (especially credit buyers) at risk of acquiring an insufficient level of credits.  
Thus a description of uncertainty may be necessary to provide information for decisions 
pertaining the AO project.  Note that we adopt the simple definition that uncertainty is a 
lack of confidence in the quantity of GHGE offsets created by an AO program.   
The sources of uncertainty in terms of GHGE offsets following (Birdsey and 
Heath, Heath and Smith) include  
o Climate and other factor induced annual production variability in the quantity 
of GHGE offset produced at a location;  
o Aggregation induced sampling error at the regional scale;  
o Carbon pool measurement errors; and  
o Intertemporal variation in the duration and permanence of carbon sequestered 
in the future. 
Some argue that GHGE offset projects should be paid for delivering the offset 
level that defines a particular confidence interval not the average amount (Canada).  For 
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example, under the environmental trading schemes, there are penalties imposed on 
shortfall of environmental commitments.  Such penalties are imposed within the sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) trading implemented in U.S.  Generally the penalty for excess emissions of 
SO2 is $2000/ton × annual adjustment factor × tons of excess emissions of SO2 (Seton's 
EH&S Compliance Resource Center), which is more than 10 time the observed price.   
Shortfall penalties and management actions have been discussed in the context of 
international GHGE offset arena regarding tradable quantities of emissions.  For 
example, Canada outlined a proposal in which the amount of carbon sequestered by a 
mitigation measure would be reported along with an estimate of the uncertainty in this 
measurement and that credits could be claimed only to the extent that there was 90% 
certainty in the amount sequestered. 
An uncertainty discount would be the reduction needed in the (expected) quantity 
of offsets necessary to reach the desired confidence level.  This reduction would be 
based on the variability in the quantity of GHGE offset (Q).  The main questions that 
need to be answered to form the uncertainty discount is what is the definition over time 
and space of the quantity that will be discounted, what are the distributional parameters 
for the Q measure, and then what level of offset could be confidently expected to occur. 
Aggregation and Uncertainty 
The first item of interest involved with agricultural offsets involves the definition of 
what is uncertain.  Conceptually, the uncertain quantity would be the amount of the 
carbon accumulated across a geographic region across a multi year agreement.  This 
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would be the collection across multiple fields /field segments each of which would 
exhibit carbon gain variability across multiple years.   
The rationale for a normality assumption arises from the Central Limit Theorem10.  
The GHGE credit buyers will likely purchase a large quantity of offsets over a number 
of years.  As a consequence, the GHGE offset quantity will be the sum of contributions 
from many individual land units over a number of years.  Statistically the uncertain 
quantity is that arising in the sample mean across a geographic and temporal population 
of offsets produced.  The Central Limit Theorem asserts that the distribution of a 
sample’s mean is normally distributed. 
 We should recognize that aggregation across space and time is expected to 
reduce the level of uncertainty.  Statistically if all farms were alike with a farm level 
standard deviation of σ  and exhibited independent distributions, then the aggregate 
average amount of carbon would have a standard deviation nσ  by the central limit 
theorem where n is the number of observations across time and across space (Moore and 
McCabe).  This means if we had a 5 year contract involving 20 farms that the standard 
deviation of the average increment would be 1/10th the individual standard deviation 
provided all the assumptions hold. 
However, independence assumption may be strong because there exists high 
correlations in sequestered carbon across space and time.  We can use the central limit 
 
                                                 
10 If x is the mean of a random sample of size n from a population with mean µ and standard deviation σ, 
then x  ~ (µ, / nσ ) (Moore and McCabe) 
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theorem when independence assumption does not hold (as long as the are not too 
strongly associated) (Moore and McCabe) but we may not use nσ  as a standard 
deviation.  Even if independence is not to be expected, aggregated standard deviation 
should be the function of sample size and it will decrease when sample size increase.  
Now we define that aggregated standard deviation is nσ  which is decreasing when 
sample size increases through aggregation11.     
Derivation of Uncertainty Discount 
Calculation of an uncertainty discount is formed based on a confidence interval approach 
that relies on a statistical distribution of the quantity of GHGE offset, Q.  Under the 
common assumption of a normal distribution we can compute the confidence level and 
uncertainty discount via standard formulae.   
Suppose that GHGE credit buyers are interested in more certain measure of 
offset volume than the mean.  We are only considering the area to the left of the mean 
because GHGE credit buyers are interested in offset below the mean.  For example, 
assume that GHGE credits will be claimed with 95% certainty.   This is illustrated in 
Figure 11. In Figure 11, QC indicates discounted Q, that is the GHGE credit, and Q  is 
the mean of Q. 
 
 
                                                 
11 If iid assumption hold, /n nσ σ=  
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(50) *C nQ Q t s= −  
where,  is discounted Q under 95%,  is the critical value for the t distribution with 
(n – 1) degree of freedom under a 95% confidence level.   
CQ
*t
Based on equation (50), the uncertainty discount (UNCER) is derived as 
follows12: 
(51) 
*
*( )(%) 100 100C nQ Q Q Q t sUNCER t CV
Q Q
− − −= × = × = ⋅ . 
Using equation (50), we can simplify UNCER as a function of the confidence 
interval specification in terms of the percentage safety margin and the CV as shown in 
equation (51).  As discussed above, UNCER tends to reduce when Q is formed by the 
aggregation over space and time due to increases in sample size.   
Approximation of Quantity of GHGE Offset Distribution  
Unfortunately, the Q distribution may not be easily obtained with reasonable cost due to 
the lack of data; difficulties in monitoring and sampling.  Also measuring sequestration 
rates for all units of land is impossible since the GHGE offset is sequestered in every 
square inch of the landscape.  In fact, if monitoring and sampling were easy and cheap, 
there would be no considerations for uncertainty.   
 
                                                 
12 Recall the definition of the GHGE discount in equation (1) such that (%) 100C
Q Q
Q
δ −= ×  
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This leads to several possibilities including: 
(i) Using an biophysical simulation model to develop distribution of Q, 
(ii) Using some other items’ distribution such as crop yield as a proxy of Q, 
or, 
(iii) Field measurement. 
All approaches give us the estimate of the CV for the quantity of GHGE offset, and then 
we can utilize equation (51).   
Biophysical Simulations 
In terms of biophysical simulations, the forest carbon budget model FORCARB 
(Birdsey, Plantinga and Birdsey) makes estimates of carbon quantities and identifies 
influences on model uncertainty using FORCARB in US forest (Smith and Heath; Heath 
and Smith).  The Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC) also simulates estimates 
of carbon quantities (Izaurralde et al.).  EPIC was originally developed to assess the 
impact of cropping practices on crop productivity of various soils (William et al.).  
Recently, EPIC has been expanded to cover the effect of a variety of land use 
management decisions on soil loss, water quality and crop yield. 
Such models can be run over varying weather, soil, and crop management 
conditions to obtain a distribution of GHGE offset levels.  One can also look at the effect 
of cumulative offset rates over years by running the model for say 25 years and 
computing the coefficient of variation for 5 year total offset production instead of single 
year data. 
 80
 
A major problem in this approach arises properly obtaining a coefficient of 
variation estimate and in properly including the variation canceling aspects of less than 
perfectly correlated offsets produced across the landscape.  Namely, it is reasonable to 
believe that across individual sites on a farm and across farms in a project there will be a 
mixture of both unique localized events and correlated weather.  For example, hail may 
be localized but temperature and frontal rains may affect most of a county.  On the other 
hand, such models also ignore a number of factors that are very localized such as wind 
damage, pest outbreaks, human and wildlife induced damage, soil and topography 
variations and lightning strikes among many other factors. This implies an 
underestimation of the coefficient of variation on a plot.  
Furthermore, when running with stochastically generated weather it would be 
difficult to obtain the proper correlation of the weather events across geographic areas 
and time and would certainly ignore a number of the other less than perfectly correlated 
more localized events.  This implies that one may be able to get estimates of the variance 
but it would be difficult to properly incorporate spatial correlation.  The only potential 
approach is to use historical weather simultaneously at all plots and correlate the results 
by year thus incorporating the spatial correlation arising across multiple weather 
stations.   
Crop Yield as Proxy Variable 
We might also use crop yield as a proxy variable of the quantity of carbon offset because 
the carbon input is proportional to plant size, which is proportional to yield (Kimble).  
An examination of EPIC results shows that the correlations between sequestration rate 
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and crop yields are very high ranging from 0.7 to 0.9 and these are statistically 
significant.  Thus we could assume that the variation in carbon sequestration can be 
proxied by the variation in crop yield.  Crop yield data are widely available from various 
USDA sources. 
However, we cannot use the CV for crop yield as the CV for GHGE offset 
because error in the estimate of the CV for GHGE offset is unavoidable because there is 
additional variation in the quantity of GHGE offset.  In a regression fitting to Q and crop 
yield such that Qi = a + b*Yi + ei, where Y is crop yield and e is the associated error 
term, then the square of the correlation coefficient is the proportion of the total variations 
in Q which is accounted for by the regression (Weisstein). 
Based on regression fitting, we can derive the relationship CVs for crop yield and 
Q as follows.  The squared total variation in Q is 2( iQ Q− )∑ .  From the regression 
fitting, the squared total variation in Q is expressed as follows:     
(52) 22 2( ) ( ) ( )i i i iQ Q a bY e a bY b Y Y e− = + + − − = − +∑ ∑ ∑ 2 2i∑ . 
From the definition of the coefficient of determination (R2) (Griffiths, Hill and Judge), 
(53) 
2
2
21 ( )
i
i
e
R
Q Q
= − −
∑
∑  
⇒ 2 2(1 ) ( )i ie R Q Q= − − 2∑ ∑  
⇒ 2 2 2 2(1 )[ ( ) ]i ie R b Y Y= − − + 2ie∑ ∑ ∑  
⇒ 
2
2 2
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R
−= −∑ ∑ 2Y . 
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Substitution equation (53) to equation (52) yields 
(54) 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
(1 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i
R bQ Q b Y Y b Y Y Y Y
R R
−− = − + − = −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 2i . 
From equation (54), we can see the total variation in Q is the proportion of the estimated 
slope coefficient, b, and R2 to the total variation in crop yield.  
 Now, we can get (sample) standard deviations if we divide both sides of equation 
(54) by (n – 1) and take a square root.  That is, 
(55) 
2 22
2
( ) ( )
1 ( 1)
i i
Q Y
Q Q Y Yb bs s
n R n
− −= =− −
∑ ∑
R
= , 
where, sQ is the standard deviation of Q and SY is the standard deviation of crop yield.  
Now, we can derive the relationship between CVs using equation (55).  Divide both 
sides of equation (55) by Q  and Y  then we get 
(56) Q Y
s sb
QY R QY
=  ⇒ Q Yb YCV CVR Q=  
⇒ 
( )Q Y
b YCV CV
R a bY
= +  
⇒ YQ CVCV R=   (when a = 0) 
 
In other words, the CV for GHGE offset is estimated using the CV for crop yield with 
some adjustment using the slope coefficient and mean. 
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Field Measurement 
The other obvious alternative for estimating the coefficient of variation involves the use 
of field measurements.  Namely, one can measure carbon stock at alternative locations 
and do other measurements relative to methane, nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide 
emissions.  The difficulty with field measurement is that it cannot really be done before 
the project is implemented and will not be available until sometime after the project has 
begun (i.e. to measure the five-year stock one must wait for five years) unless highly 
similar projects appear within the same region.  Clearly such measurements will provide 
a valuable check on a priori estimates and, if employed, will provide a basis for revising 
the estimates later during the project life.  It may also be difficult to have a large enough 
sample to accurately estimate the variance reducing properties of the diverse spatial 
scale of a contract.  However, this approach will not be utilized in this study. 
Concluding Remarks  
The quantity of GHGE offset created by the AO project may need to be adjusted to 
claim GHGE credits due to regulatory or credit buyers require avoiding the liability of 
shortfalls.  This would invoke an uncertainty discount.  In the AO project, the 
uncertainty discount would reduce credits for offsets from AO, which could be 
confidently to occur.   
To compute the uncertainty discount we need to know the distribution of the 
GHGE offsets.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to observe this distribution in practice.  
Here, we can use either the environmental simulation model such as EPIC to estimate 
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the distribution or a proxy using the distribution of crop yields.  Once we have 
distributional parameters under the normality assumption, we can compute the 
uncertainty discount via standard formulae in statistics.  It is noteworthy that aggregation 
over space and time is important. 
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CHAPTER VII 
EMPIRICAL MAGNITUDES OF GHGE OFFSET DISCOUNTS 
 
In this chapter, we examine the empirical magnitudes of GHGE offset discounts for a 
case study project in the Southeast Texas.   
Background 
The area in Texas between Beaumont, Houston and Victoria has historically been a rice 
production area.  In 2000, the planted acreage of rice was 214,000 acres, while rice 
production amounted to 14.3 million cwt and the value of the rice crop was $93 million.   
The recent policy and market environment have put pressures on rice acreage and 
production (USDA, 2001).  Rice producers in Texas face high production costs, lack of 
economically viable rotation crops, low rice prices, diminishing government payments, 
and weather variability.  Considerable reduction in Texas rice production has occurred 
with a 37% reduction in acreage and a 30% production reduction between 1990 and 
2000.  Today, many Texas rice producers are in quest of new opportunities.   
One possible opportunity for rice farmers would be participation in an AO 
program. Under a GHGE trading program, rice growers could convert rice fields to other 
crops, pasture, or forests to reduce net GHGE and be paid by purchasers of GHGE 
credits such as power plants or governments.   
In terms of GHGE, rice is a source of methane emissions caused by anaerobic 
decomposition of organic matter in a flooded environment.  Conversion of rice to less 
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intensively tilled crop-mix, pasture or trees would reduce methane emissions, increase 
sequestration and probably reduce emissions from nitrogen use, water pumping and farm 
fuel consumption.   
Scenarios 
There are several options for an AO project involving rice acreage: conversion of rice 
fields to (i) other crops, specifically rice to a cotton, sorghum, and soybean crop mix in 
the region (ii) pasturelands, and (iii) forest uses.  We divide each scenario into some sub-
scenarios.  In cases of (i) rice to other crops, (ii) rice to pasture, there are two sub-cases: 
A1 Reverting back to previous management or land use after carbon 
sequestration saturates (in year 20), and 
A2 Continuing the AO practice after saturation based on economic superiority. 
In the case of (iii) afforestation, there are three broad options based on forest 
management and six sub-options based on reforestation. 
(F-I)  Forests kept to saturation (in year 80),  
 F1: No harvest, 
 F2: Harvest at year 80 but no reforestation;  
(F-II) Shorter rotation (harvest at year 20)  
 F3: No reforestation;  
 F4: Reforestation;  
 (F-III) Longer rotation (harvest at year 50) 
 F5: No reforestation 
 F6: Reforestation. 
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Quantity of GHGE Offset 
The quantity of GHGE offset (Q) from a rice land conversion consists of four parts, (i) 
sequestered carbon in soil and trees, (ii) saved GHG from discontinuing rice cultivation, 
(iii) reduction in fossil fuel usage for machinery, and (iv) change in emissions stimulated 
by nitrogen fertilizer and irrigation use.     
Sequestered Carbon 
Estimates of changes in sequestered carbon are obtained through use of the Erosion 
Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC).  EPIC was originally developed to assess the 
impact of cropping practices on crop productivity of various soils (Williams et al.). 
Recently, EPIC has been expanded to cover the effect of a variety of land-use 
management decisions on soil loss, water quality and crop yield.   
In addition EPIC now estimates carbon sequestration  (Izaurralde et al.).  For 
more details about EPIC model, refer to Izaurralde et al., and http://www.brc.tamus.edu/ 
epic/ introduction/aboutepicmodel.html.  In this study, the rate of carbon sequestration is 
calculated based on the simulated carbon pool results developed by EPIC: 
(57) 
YearsSimulatedofNumber 
SOC/ac InitialSOC/ac FinalSOC/ac/yr of Rate −= . 
That is, the periodic average annual rate of SOC is the difference between two estimates 
of SOC divided by the length (in years) as shown in equation (57) (Smith and Heath).   
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In case of afforestation in rice fields in Southeast Texas area, the annual rate of 
SOC is estimated from EPIC as 3.0 tons/ac/yr.  In case of conversion to crop mix13, the 
annual rate of SOC is 0.4 tons/ac/yr and the annual rate of pasture SOC is 1.7 tons/ac/yr.  
These numbers can be compared with other science researches on rate of SOC for forest 
and pasture establishment after agricultural use.   
Post and Kwon review literatures that reports rate of SOC after changes in land-
use that favor carbon accumulation.  The average of rate of SOC for afforestation is 3.2 
tons/acre and the average of rate of SOC for pasture is 2.0 tons/acre in warm temperature 
zone even if there is a large amount of variation in rates (refer to Post and Kwon for 
more details). 
Saved GHG 
Methane 
All of the rice in Texas is grown under flooded conditions.  When fields are flooded, 
aerobic decomposition of organic material gradually depletes the oxygen present in the 
soil and floodwater, and anaerobic conditions develop in the soils.  At that point, 
methane is produced through anaerobic decomposition of soil organic matter by 
methanogenic bacteria.  As much as 20 to 40 percent of the methane produced is 
transported from the soil to the atmosphere primarily by diffusive transport through rice 
 
                                                 
13 A crop mix is the percentage of planted acres for each crop in the specific region relative to the total 
planted acres in the region. This method establishes the typical cropping practice in a county and weights 
each crop according to its importance.  Based on historical data, crop mix for the Southeast Texas is 
composed of sorghum, soybean and cotton. 
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plants (Holzapfel-Pschorn et al.; Sass et al.; US EPA 1999).  When rice cultivation is 
discontinued, methane emissions are removed. 
Methane emissions from rice cultivation can be estimated using the method 
suggested by US EPA that involves the acreage of rice grown in an area, estimates of the 
average number of days flooded, and emission factors for the amount of methane 
emitted per acre-day of flooding (US EPA 1999).  It is noteworthy that we should 
convert the methane emission to metric tons of carbon equivalent for comparison using 
global warming potential.   
Once we get the methane emission in metric tons then we multiply by 12/44 (the 
ratio of the molecular weight of carbon to the molecular weight of CO2) and by 21 (the 
100-year global warming potential of methane as in IPCC report, US EPA, 2001) to 
obtain methane emissions in metric tons of carbon equivalent. Under this calculation, 
average annual methane emissions are 0.76 tons/ac/yr of carbon equivalent. 
 
Reduced Carbon from Reduction in Fuel Usage 
When producers use machinery for cultivating and irrigating rice fields, they use fossil 
fuels and emit carbon dioxide.  Carbon dioxide emission is calculated using formulas 
developed by US EPA (2003) (http://www.epa.gov/region4/air/cai/formulas_main.htm).   
According to US EPA (2003), 1 gallon of fuel emits 22 lbs carbon dioxide.  Based 
on the budget table for rice cultivation, average usage of fossil fuel is approximately 11.2 
gallons/ac/yr (Anderson).  The carbon dioxide emission associated with this works out to 
be 246.4 lbs/ac/yr and in turn it is 0.03 tons/ac/yr of carbon equivalent.  Note that we 
assume to be no reductions in fuel usage in case of conversion to crop mix.  
 90
 
Table 8. Total Quantity GHGE Offset Under Each Alternative (Unit: ton/ac/yr of 
               carbon equivalent) 
 Rice to Crop Mix Rice to Pasture Rice to Forests 
    Sequestered Carbon 0.40 1.69 3.02 
    Methane 0.76 0.76 0.76 
    Saved Fuel Usage 0.00 0.03 0.03 
Total 1.16 2.50 3.81 
 
 
 
 
Total Quantity of GHGE Offset 
Based on the above results, total quantity of GHGE offset per acre under each alternative 
is calculated.  Table 8 contains all the results.  Afforestation offsets rate is the largest 
which is estimated as 3.81 tons/ac/yr of carbon equivalent and pasturelands saves GHGE 
of 2.50 tons/ac/yr of carbon equivalent while a conversion to crop mix yields 1.16 
tons/ac/yr of carbon equivalent.  In other words, we can expect to save 3.81 tons/ac/yr of 
carbon equivalent when we convert rice field to forests lands. 
Additionality 
As discussed in Chapter III, the GHGE offset based on the AO project should be 
additional to the baseline that is change expected by extrapolation of historical trends.  In 
an AO project, the additionality is concerned when the region where a project is being 
proposed has had substantial adoption of the AO practice in the absence of GHG 
programs, and this adoption is expected to continue.  In such a case, a discount for the 
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region may need to reflect business-as-usual AO practices adoption.  In the Southeast 
Texas case study, we need to examine the without project incidence of rice land 
conversion to other uses. 
We will use the project-based approach to determine the additionality discount in 
Chapter III.  For doing this, we need the estimates of land use transitions and will then 
compute baseline GHGE offset.  In order to estimate the land use transitions, we will 
utilize the Markov transition matrix and the econometric so-called land share model.  
After finding land conversion rates, we will estimate the additionality discount.   
Under the project-based approach, we will determine the baseline using historical 
data in the project area and estimate of expected GHGE offset created by the land use 
changes.  However, errors in the estimate of the additionality discount are unavoidable 
because precise baseline estimation is impossible.     
Estimation of Land Conversion Rates  
Land Conversion Rates with Markov Matrices 
Table 9 contains a Markov land transition matrix for the Southeast Texas area for 1992-
1997 drawn from the Census of Agriculture for 1992 and 1997.  Note that reading across 
the row, we find the probabilities that were converted to another use between observations. 
The Markov land transition matrix in Table 9 is 5-year transition probabilities so 
that we need to develop one-year transition probability matrix.  Since n-year transition 
probability matrix can be obtained by computing the nth power of the one-year transition 
probability matrix (Hiller and Lieberman), we can find one-year transition probability 
matrix using the nth roots of n-year transition probability matrix.  This can be done using 
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a GAMS program, which finds the fifth roots of Markov transition matrices by 
minimizing the deviations between the fifth power of a matrix and the observed 5-year 
transition.  In turn, estimates of the annual conversion rates are obtained (See Table 10). 
 
Land Conversion Rates with Land Share Model 
For the econometric model of land use, equation (23) in Chapter III is estimated using 
data on land use.  Each cropland, forest, and urban land share, denoted yk(t, j), is defined 
as the share of total land in each county.  County-level observations are available from 
the Census of Agriculture for 1992 and 1997, Forest Inventory and Analysis Data Bases 
Retrieval System (http://www.srsfia.usfs.msstate.edu), and the Texas Almanac (Ramos). 
 
 
 
Table 9. Markov Transition Matrix for Southeast Texas for 92-97 (Probability) 
          To 
From Corn Sorghum Wheat Rice Cotton Soybean Hay Others
1) Woodland Other2) Pasture 1992 total 
Corn 0.742 0.047   0.014 0.068 0.051 0.016  0.062  1.00 
Sorghum  1.000          1.00 
Wheat  0.023 0.872  0.007 0.034 0.025 0.008  0.031  1.00 
Rice  0.048  0.736 0.014 0.070 0.052 0.016  0.063  1.00 
Cotton     1.000       1.00 
Soybean      1.000      1.00 
Hay       1.000     1.00 
Others        1.000    1.00 
Woodland  0.029    0.042 0.032 0.010 0.839 0.039  1.00 
Other          1.000  1.00 
Pasture           0.998 1.00 
1997 
total 0.742 1.147 0.872 0.736 1.035 2.249 1.160 1.050 0.839 1.195 0.998  
Source: Census of Agriculture 1992 and 1997 
Note: 1) Other crops and  2)  Land in house lots, ponds, roads, wasteland, etc 
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Table 10. Annual Rate of Conversion from Markov Matrix (unit: %/yr) 
Cases Rice to         
 Rice Sorghum Cotton Soybean Hay Other1) Others2) Pasture Wood 
Conversion 
Rates 94.7 0.96 0.28 1.4 1.04 1.26 0.32 0.00 0.00 
  
Note that conversion rates of other land uses not listed are zero 
1) Other implies other crops 
2) Others implies land in house lots, ponds, roads, wasteland, etc 
 
 
As suggested in Chapter III, a land share equation involves a function of net 
returns from specific land use, and land quality.  Net returns denoted NRk(t, j) are defined 
as the present discounted value for an infinite stream for timber and as the net return in 
time t for crops.  Land Capability Class (LCC) rating, denoted L(j) can be used as proxies 
for land quality variable.  LCC ratings are derived from county-level soil surveys and 
based on twelve soil characteristics such as slope, permeability etc.  Note that L(j) is not 
indexed by t because land quality measures remain constant over time.  Also, population 
density is used as one of the explanatory variables.  In other empirical land use analyses, 
population measures are used to account for the allocation of land to non-rural uses.   
Specifically, the following equations are estimated: 
(58) 
0 1 2
3 4
5 6
ln( ( , ) / ( , )) ( , ) ( , )
                                          ( , ) ( , )
                                          ( , ) ( , )
   
k RICE k k RICE k SORG
k COTT k CORN
k SOYB k
y t j y t j NR t j NR t j
NR t j NR t j
NR t j NR t j
β β β
β β
β β
= + + +
+ +
+ +
7 8 9                                      ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )k TREE k k kNR t j PD t j L j e t jβ β β+ + +
 
where, PD(t, j) is population density and ),0(~),( kk jte Ω  and kΩ  are assumed to be 
diagonal matrices.   
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Equation (58) can be estimated with ordinary least squares.  The procedure from 
White is used to correct the estimates for an unknown form of heteroscedasticity, and the 
procedure in Newey and West autocorrelation-consistent matrix with order 1 is used to 
correct an autocorrelation problem in the model.   
Net returns for each crop equal the real annual per-acre net revenues, which are 
revenue (price times yield) less variable production costs14.  Price, yield and cost data 
are obtained from Texas Agricultural Statistics Service for each year and Texas Crop 
Enterprise Budgets from Texas Agricultural Extension at Texas A&M University 
System (Anderson)15.  Net return for forest is measured as the annuity equivalent of the 
20 years (F4; short rotation, multiple harvest case) stream of timber revenues per acre 
base. Timber production data are from, FASOM, Xu and Forestry Inventory and 
Analysis databases retrieval system (http://www.srsfia.usfs.msstate.edu). Forest 
production costs data are from Dubois, Erwin and Straka.   
Total differentiation of equation (58) indicates that the estimated coefficients 
measure the percentage change in the share ratios for one-unit change in the independent 
variables.  In other words, ceteris paribus, a one-unit change in the rice rent increases or 
decreases the ratio of other crop or forestland by estimated coefficients.   
Estimation results are reported in the Table 11.  The variable Sorg/Rice indicates 
the ratio of sorghum acreage to rice acreage as a dependent variable, and others have 
 
                                                 
14 5 year average prices are used when crop revenues are calculated since Census of Agriculture is 
surveyed for 5- year term.  In other words, the data in 1992 or 1997 are assumed to reflect past 5-year 
producers’ behavior 
15 Costs are assumed to be constant over the region (county). 
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analogous definition.  The variable N_Rice indicates net return of rice, and other variables 
have definitions.  The variable PD indicates the population density and L indicates the soil 
quality.  All of coefficients for net return of rice are significantly negative.  It implies that 
increasing net return of rice reduces other crops’ acreage.  From the Table 11 (especially, 
the coefficient of net returns for rice), conversion rates can be obtained (See Table 12). 
 
Table 11. Land Share Model Estimation Results 
Variables Sorghum/Rice Cotton/Rice Corn/Rice Soybean/Rice Pasture/Rice Tree/Rice Urban/Rice 
N_Rice -0.0257* -0.0193* -0.1526 -0.0303* -0.0242* -0.0191* -0.0236*
(Net return of rice) (-4.507) (-3.460) (-1.877) (-8.664) (-7.646) (-8.336) (-5.514) 
N_Sorg 0.0056 0.0099 -0.0269** 0.0076 -0.0088 -0.0123* -0.0039 
(Net return of sorghum) (0.568) (1.033) (-2.218) (0.892) (-1.827) (-2.440) (-0.407) 
N_Cott -0.0079* -0.0081* 0.0006 -0.0054* -0.0038* -0.0044* -0.0036 
(Net return of cotton) (-3.152) (-3.009) (0.167) (-3.172) (-2.610) (-2.784) (-1.174) 
N_Corn 0.0051 0.0032 0.0191* 0.0070 0.0188* 0.0204* 0.0243*
(Net return of corn) (0.787) (0.452) (2.557) (1.166) (8.027) (8.717) (5.756) 
N_Soyb 0.0063 -0.0018 -0.0055 0.0115 0.0151** 0.0130* 0.0256**
(Net return of soybean) (0.509) (-0.126) (-0.299) (1.849) (2.369) (2.619) (2.160) 
N_Past 0.0104** 0.0050 0.0015 0.0132** 0.0213* 0.0266* 0.0213*
(Net return of pasture) (2.094) (1.062) (0.196) (2.236) (10.80) (10.98) (6.933) 
N_Tree 0.2812* 0.2986* 0.0463 0.0688 0.1660* 0.1371* 0.1932*
(Net return of tree) (2.533) (2.484) (0.406) (0.904) (3.674) (3.127) (2.728) 
PD 1.3041 2.7394* -2.0270 2.0859* 1.7666* 1.8899* 3.1479*
(Population density) (1.328) (2.656) (-1.866) (2.965) (3.227) (2.794) (3.192) 
L -0.0214 -3.1301* -2.4137 1.8719 2.0357* 5.9165* 1.5310 
(Soil quality) (-0.018) (-2.483) (-1.338) (1.148) (3.457) (6.477) (1.410) 
Constant -9.3473** -8.6612 1.0078 -4.4419 -5.2724* -9.7507* -8.0164*
 (-1.957) (-1.729) (0.1925) (-1.093) (-3.307) (-5.579) (-2.824) 
R-square 0.7579 0.7834 0.6443 0.8411 0.8845 0.8778 0.7790 
Durbin-Watson 2.1567 2.2971 2.6467 2.1082 2.8372 2.0670 2.4782 
Log Likelihood -14.7226 -15.3944 -20.7512 -12.9992 -5.7455 -5.8854 -14.9731 
Note: T-values are in parentheses, * denotes significance at the 5%, and ** at the 10% level. 
Sample size is 32 for each equation (Full sample size is 224). 
Variable descriptions are in parentheses below each variable. 
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Table 12. Conversion Rates in SE Texas from Land Share Model 
 Sorg/Rice Cott/Rice Corn/Rice Soyb/Rice Past/Rice Fore/Rice 
Ratio Increase by (%) 0.9472 0.6684 0.4775 1.0723 1.1244 0.9439 
1997 Ratio 1.0893 0.6729 0.5161 0.5174 12.0941 1.5384 
Increase to 1.0997 0.6774 0.5186 0.5230 12.2300 1.5529 
Conversion (acres) 1321.2 720.9 436.2 979.4 2763.2 1529.1 
Conversion Rate (%) 0.4914 0.2681 0.1623 0.3643 1.0278 0.5688 
 
 
 
Estimation of Additionality Discount 
Several assumptions are needed to find the additionality discount.  Assume that the 
program horizon is 100 years and the year of saturation is assumed to be 20 for 
sequestration on cropland and the year of saturation is 80 for afforestation.  Note that the 
proposed AO programs are (i) rice to other crops, (ii) rice to pasture and (iii) rice to forest. 
Additionality in Rice to Other Crops 
In case of rice to other crops, we assume that producers rotate sorghum, soybean and 
cotton on rice fields.  The approximation of rotation ratio of sorghum, soybean and 
cotton historically is 2:1:2 during 1990-2000.  In turn, the additionality discount (ADD) 
for crop mix can be computed as follows: 
(59) 
20 20 20 20
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where, B(t) is the total amount of baseline GHGE reductions in time t, A is the total 
project area,  is net AO offset rate for alternative k in time t.  can be 
obtained from EPIC model as discussed in the above section. 
( )kSR t ( )kSR t
From equation (59), ADD for conversion to other crops is found to be (i) 30.7% 
with the Markov model, and (ii) 23.8% with the land share model.  Thus, ADD estimate 
for crop mix is presumed to be 27.3% that is an average of both.  It implies that the 
GHGE credit created by a conversion to other crops is 72.3% of credits or 72.3 units 
when producers offset 100 units of GHGE. 
 
Additionality in Rice to Pasture 
Using the same method, we can find additionality in rice to pasture program.  ADD for 
pasture will be as follows: 
(60) 
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Note that there is no conversion of rice lands to pastureland observed in the 
Southeast Texas during 1992-1997 so that we may conclude that there is no additionality 
discount in case of converting to pasturelands.  However, ADD would not be zero because 
the land would have been converted to other land uses as illustrated in Chapter III. 
From equation (60), ADD for pasture is found to be (i) 15.0% with the Markov 
model, and (ii) 11.7% with the land share model.  We use an average of both ADD 
estimates as the ADD for pasture option, which is 13.4%. 
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Additionality in Rice to Forest (Afforestation)  
Using the same procedure, we can find additionality in rice to forest program.  ADD for 
afforestation will be as follows: 
(61) 
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Note that there is no conversion of rice field to forestland in the Southeast Texas 
during 1992-1997 so that we might conclude that there is no additionality discount in 
case of afforestation.  But this would be wrong, as rice lands would have been converted 
to other uses as we pointed out above.  From equation (61), ADD for afforestation is 
found to be (i) 3.1% with Markov model, and (ii) 2.4% with land share model.  ADD 
estimate for afforestation is presumed to be an average, 2.8%. 
Additionality Discount and Implications 
Table 13 summarizes above results.  As shown in Table 13, all the additionality 
discounts are positive.  Note that positive additionality discount reduces the salable 
GHGE offset.   It is noteworthy that the additionality discount for conversion to 
afforestation seems to be zero in the Southeast Texas because there is no conversion to 
forestlands from rice fields observed during 1992-1997.  However, when considering the 
baseline trend of rice to convert to other uses, the additionality discount is 2.8%.   
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Table 13. Additionality Discounts in Southeast Texas (Unit: %) 
Cases From Markov Model From Land Share Model Average ADD  
Rice to Crop Mix 30.7 23.8 27.3 
Rice to Pasture 15.0 11.7 13.4 
Rice to Forest 3.1 2.4 2.8 
 
 
 
 
 
It shows that consideration of multiple land uses is important.  That is, 2.8% of the 
projected GHGE offset would occurs in the case due to land use change but none of that 
would involve afforestation.  Also, an AO project which has a high carbon sequestration 
rate has a small ADD such as pasture and forests as shown in Table 13 because the 
business-as-usual offset consequences are much smaller than the project offsets.   
Leakage  
As discussed in Chapter IV, the quantity of GHGE offset can be reduced by an induced 
increase in economic activity and consequent GHGE in other areas when the AO project 
goes into effect.  This implies that the quantity of GHGE offset by the AO practice 
should be adjusted by a leakage discount.   
When the AO policy causes a switch from rice fields into pastureland or 
forestland, rice production falls so that total rice supply will decrease.  But hay or timber 
production may increase.  This causes rice prices to rise and hay or timber prices to 
decrease when the ceteris paribus assumption holds.  This change in prices stimulates 
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producers who are not in the AO program to increase their land allocation to rice and 
reduce pasturelands or forest assuming no management change and equal GHGE rates, 
when lands are reallocated, leakage can occur. 
Leakage Estimation 
Recall the leakage discount formula in Chapter IV is: 
(62) 
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where, k depicts each source such as other croplands, pastureland or forests lands, SRkOut 
is the sequestration rate of alternative k, CRkOut is the (absolute value of) conversion rate 
from or to the k alternative and CROut is the total conversion rate that is defined as 
 and SR the net emission rate.  Also, EOut kOutCR CR= ∑ S indicates the supply elasticity, 
ED is the demand elasticity and EInput is the input (land) elasticity.   Finally,  
indicates the initial land allocation in project area. 
0
ProjL
Necessary parameters are estimated based on NASS/USDA crop and price data 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/psd.  Total U.S. rice acreage is 3.04 million 
acres in 2000, and outside of the Southeast Texas rice acreage is 2.83 million acres.  
Total rice production is 190.87 million cwt and outside of the Southeast Texas rice 
production is 176.53 million cwt.   
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The input (land) elasticity, EInput, which is defined in equation (32) in Chapter IV, 
is obtained using a simple regression with supply on harvested acreage from 1981 – 
1999 including a trend variable. We assume that the input elasticity is constant over time 
and regions.  We use least squares with a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to correct for serial 
correlation.  Results are as follows (Numbers in parentheses are p-values): 
 
Ln QS = –2.7054 + 0.9003 Ln L – 0.0099Trend   
    (0.0048)  (0.0000)          (0.0146) 
R-Square = 0.924 DW = 1.92 
 
where, QS is rice supply and L is harvested acreage.  From the above results, the input 
elasticity of the land is estimated as 0.9003.  In other words, rice supply increases by 
0.9% when rice land increases by 1% or vice-versa. 
The rice demand elasticity, ED, is found again using a simple regression where 
we regress total rice consumption on rice price, rice expenditure and CPI.  We assume 
that the demand elasticity is constant.  We use least squares with a Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure to correct for serial correlation to estimate the rice demand elasticity. Also we 
impose a homogeneity restriction on the equation.  Results are as follows (Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values): 
 
Ln QD = 0.9064 – 0.9139 Ln P – 0.1672 Ln CPI + 1.0811 Ln Expenditure 
     (0.0006) (0.0000)           (0.0002)              (0.0000)  
R-Square = 0.924 DW = 2.00 
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where, QD is rice use, P is rice price, CPI is consumer price index which is a proxy of 
prices of substitute and complementary goods and Expenditure is expenditures for rice.  
From above results, the demand elasticity is estimated as –0.9139. 
Rice supply elasticity, ES, can be also found using a simple regression of rice 
production on price.  We assume that the supply elasticity is constant.  We use least 
squares with the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to correct for serial correlation to estimate 
the following equation.  Results are as follows (Numbers in parentheses are p-values): 
 
Ln QS = 8.0517 +0.3760 Ln P – 0.1884 Ln PPF + 0.0117 Trend 
  (0.0801) (0.0165)           (0.8377)               (0.5207)  
R-Square = 0.510 DW = 1.80 
 
where, QS is rice supply, P is rice price, PPF is price paid by farmer which is a proxy 
variable for input prices.  From above results, the supply elasticity is estimated as 0.3760. 
For calculating leakage, we need to look at where land goes and comes from.  As 
discussed in Chapter IV, leakage may occur through more than one market.  In other 
words, land use change in outside of project area can be further segmented into some 
parts for considering land conversion involving different markets such as products from 
croplands, pasture or forestry.  To do this, there is need to predict land use change and it 
can be done with a Markov model.  We develop the Markov transition matrix for outside 
of the Southeast Texas (See Table 14).  This shows that rice land has been converted to 
corn, soybean, forestlands and other such as lands in house, roads or wasteland in the 
rest of the U.S. 
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Table 14. Markov Transition Matrix for Outside of Southeast Texas (Probability) 
             To 
From Corn Sorghum Wheat Rice Cotton Soybean Hay Others
1) Woodland Other2) Pasture 1992 total
Corn 1.000           1.000 
Sorghum 0.055 0.447  0.003 0.017 0.230 0.070  0.050 0.127 0.001 1.000 
Wheat 0.007  0.875 0.001 0.007 0.054 0.019  0.009 0.027  1.000 
Rice 0.002   0.984  0.005   0.004 0.004  1.000 
Cotton 0.019    0.883 0.034 0.003  0.028 0.032  1.000 
Soybean      1.000      1.000 
Hay       1.000     1.000 
Others 0.010    0.001 0.031 0.007 0.920 0.013 0.018  1.000 
Woodland 0.001     0.001   0.997 0.002  1.000 
Other          1.000  1.000 
Pasture 0.005  0.005 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.011 0.947 1.000 
 
Source: Computed from Census of Agriculture, 1992 and 1997 
1) Other crops 
2) Land in house lots, ponds, roads, wasteland, etc 
 
 
 
 
 
The Markov land transition matrix in Table 14 is a 5-year transition probabilities 
so that we need to develop one-year transition probability matrix.  Since n-year transition 
probability matrix can be obtained by computing the nth power of the one-year transition 
probability matrix (Hiller and Lieberman), we can find one-year transition probability 
matrix using the nth roots of n-year transition probability matrix again using GAMS. 
Once we find one-year transition probabilities, then the annual land use 
conversion rate is obtained (See Table 15).  Note that carbon sequestration rates are 
simulated for each case using the EPIC crop simulator.  And these are assumed to be the 
same outside of Southeast Texas as in. 
In this case, equation (62) can be rewritten as follows: 
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Table 15.  Conversion Rate and Sequestration Rate for Outside of Southeast Texas 
Cases Conversion Rate (CRk) Weights (CRk/CR) Sequestration Rate (SRk) 
     Rice to Corn 0.04 %/year 0.133 -0.04 ton/acre 
     Rice to Soybean 0.10 %/year 0.333 1.75 ton/acre 
     Rice to Forest 0.08 %/year 0.267 3.05 ton/acre 
     Rice to Other 0.08 %/year 0.267 0.89 ton/acre 
Sum 0.3 %/year (CR) 1.000  
 
 
 
 
(63) 
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where, each subscript indicates each crop or alternative.  The other subscripts indicate 
lands in house lots, ponds, roads, wastelands, etc.  Note that subscript AO stands for 
crop mix, pasture and tree.  Based on the above results, a leakage discount for each AO 
project is calculated using equation (63).  Table 16 contains the results. 
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Table 16. Leakage Discount for Each AO Project (Unit:%) 
Alternatives Crop Mix Pasture Afforestation 
LEAK 38.5 17.9 11.7 
 
 
 
Leakage Discounts and Implications 
We compute that the leakage discount for the conversion rice to other crops in Southeast 
Texas area as 38.5%.  This implies that if there are 100 units of GHGE offsets in the 
Southeast Texas area through this project, there are additional GHGE of 38.5 units 
stimulated outside of the Southeast Texas, and in turn, the salable GHGE offset is only 
64.6 units.  Also, rice to pasture projects leak at a rate of 17.9% and rice to afforestation 
leaks at a rate of 11.7%.   
Permanence 
As discussed in Chapter V, an AO project is not necessarily permanent.  Namely, once 
the AO project is put into place, the realized soil carbon gains are stored in a volatile 
form and the annual rate of carbon gains are not the same over time.  In particular, the 
soil carbon content reaches a new equilibrium when the soil saturates.  Furthermore, 
when the AO practice is discontinued, most of the carbon is released quickly to the 
atmosphere.  In this context, we need additional considerations since these permanence 
characteristics change the GHGE credits generated by the AO project.  
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Table 17. Proportion of Sequestered Carbon and Other Permanent Emission Offset 
  Crop Mix Pasture Afforestation 
Sequestered Carbon (CE) 0.310 0.681 0.793 
Other (permanent) (OE) 0.690 0.319 0.207 
 
Note: All numbers are proportion to total GHGE offsets 
 
 
 
 
As argued in Chapter V, to compute the permanence discount, we need 
assumptions for carbon price, time horizon (equivalence time, Te), and interest rate.  We 
assume that carbon price, P(t) is $1/ton and constant over time, the time horizon is 100 
years, and interest rate is 4% per year.  Note that we consider multiple offset cases in this 
analysis so that we need to decompose the quantity of GHGE offset into temporal offset 
(CE) and permanent offset (OE), which is reported in Table 17.  Recall the permanence 
discount equation,   
(64)  0
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where, ST is saturation year, P(t) is carbon price in time t, and Q(t) is the quantity of 
GHGE offset in time t.  
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Table 18. Permanence Discounts for Rice to Other Crops 
Cases  Saturation Practice After PERM 
  Year Saturation (%) 
Rice to A1 20 Revert 3.7 
Crop Mix A2 20 Maintain 0.0 
Rice to A1 20 Revert 29.7 
Pasture A2 20 Maintain 0.0 
 
 
 
Permanence Discount in Rice to Other Crops and Pasture 
Based on Table 17 and equation (64), we can calculate permanence discounts.  Table 18 
contains permanence discounts for crop-mix and pasture alternatives.  Positive 
permanence discounts reduces the salable GHGE offset.  Case A1 for crop mix exhibits 
the positive permanence discounts of 3.7% and Case A1 for pasture exhibits 29.7%.  
Cases A2 for crop mix and pasture has a zero permanence discount because there is no 
volatility after saturation as discussed in Chapter VI.  Note that case A1 for crop mix 
exhibits a small PERM because the permanent GHGE offset is relatively large to 
temporal carbon sequestration (see Table 17). 
Permanence Discounts in Afforestation 
In the case of afforestation, volatility occurs when lands revert to agricultural use after 
harvest or much of above and belowground carbon is removed in the harvesting process.  
The afforestation case, the calculation of permanence discount is more complicated than 
agricultural soil offset because there is need to include (i) timing of forest harvest (rotation 
type: shorter rotation or longer rotation), and (ii) whether reforestation occurs after harvest.   
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When reforestation is not allowed, we can utilize equation (64) directly to 
estimate permanence discount.  However, we need to modify equation (64) when we 
consider reforestation to reflect re-accumulation of carbon.  Recall the permanence 
discount formula when reforestation is allowed: 
(65)  
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where RYn is nth rotation or harvest year.  
Based on Table 17 for the multi-offset case and equation (64), we can calculate 
permanence discounts.  Table 19 contains permanence discounts for afforestation.  Most of 
the permanence discounts are positive which imply that the salable GHGE offset reduced 
by permanence.  Shorter rotations (F3 and F4) exhibit the large permanence discounts.   
 
 
Table 19. Permanence Discounts for Afforestation 
Cases  Saturation Harvest Reforest PERM 
  Year Age after (%) 
    Harvest  
F1 Forest kept 80 Never - 0.0 
F2 to saturation 80 80 No 3.1 
      
F3 Shorter 80 20 No 31.9 
F4 rotation 80 20 Yes 9.2 
      
F5 Longer 80 50 No 11.6 
F6 rotation 80 50 Yes 7.1 
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Uncertainty 
As discussed in Chapter VI, the term uncertainty is used to describe variations in the 
quantity of GHGE offsets produced due to climatic/environmental variability, lack of 
knowledge or surprise.  We adopt the simple definition that uncertainty is a lack of 
confidence in a GHGE offset. 
Conceptually the uncertain quantity would be the quantity of GHGE offset 
accumulated across a geographic region and across a multi year agreement.  This would 
be the collection across multiple fields /field segments each of which would exhibit yield 
variability across multiple years.  For the purposes of this study, we will assume this can 
be proxied by the agricultural district (which is a combination of several counties) level 
GHGE offset distribution on a multi year basis (we will use 5 years).   
Recall an uncertainty discount (UNCER) under given confidence interval based 
on the normality assumption: 
(66)  *(%)UNCER t CV= ⋅
where, the CV is the coefficient of variation of the GHGE offset in the region and  is 
the critical value for the t distribution with (n – 1) degree of freedom under a given 
confidence level.  As argued in Chapter VI, it is difficult to estimate the CV of the 
GHGE offset because it is impossible to find distributional parameters to define the 
GHGE offset density function with a reasonable cost due to the lack of data coupled with 
difficulties in monitoring and sampling.  
*t
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In this study, we propose two approaches: (i) Use the CV of crop yields as an 
approximation of the GHGE offset CV, and (ii) Use the EPIC simulation under various 
weather scenarios and various regions, and find the GHGE offset CV. 
Crop Yield CV as Proxy of GHGE Offset CV 
As pointed out in Chapter VI, the CV of the GHGE offset cannot be easily found 
because data on sequestration histories of many parcels of the land in the project area is 
unavailable.  We will use the crop yield as a proxy variable of the quantity of carbon 
offset because the carbon input is proportional to plant size, which is proportional to 
yield (Kimble).  An examination of EPIC results shows that the correlations between 
sequestration rate and crop yields are very high ranging from 0.7 to 0.9 and these are 
statistically significant.   
As given in equation (56) in Chapter VI, the CV for GHGE offset can be found 
using the CV for crop yield such that /Q YCV CV R=  where R is the square root of the 
coefficient of determination (R2) from the regression fitting16.  It is noteworthy that we 
have only soybean, sorghum and rice simulation results which have both GHGE offset 
and yield data. Thus we use an average of R2, which is 0.57.  This implies that the 
correlation coefficient is 0.75.  The CV for crop yield can be found from various USDA 
sources, mainly, database on the Economic Research Service web available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/psd/.  
 
                                                 
16 As argued in Chapter VI, intercept term in regression should be zero to use this formula to find the CV 
for GHGE offset.  Most of regression results show that intercept term is zero statistically. 
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In empirically estimating examining uncertainty, we use yield data for 6 regional 
crops - sorghum, corn, rice, wheat, upland cotton and soybean from 1990 to 2001.  Table 
20 contains CVs for U.S., state, district and county level yield data.  As we expect, 
aggregation across space reduces the CV.  In case of soybeans, the CV for the U.S. is 
7.0%, the CV for Texas is 15.6%, and the CV for a substate region (district 9 in Texas 
which consists of 13 counties) is 18.1% and the CV at the county level (Brazoria county 
in District 9 in Texas) is 23.1%.   
From CVs for crop we can find the CV for GHGE offset using equation (56), that 
is, multiply by 1/R to the CV for crop yield, which is 1.32 (= 1/ 0.57 ).  Thus, the CV 
for GHGE offset is inflated about 32%.  We don’t report the CV for GHGE offset here, 
because there are two difficulties in selection of regional scale and crop which is the best 
proxy for the CV for GHGE offset.  This will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
 
Table 20. CV for Yield Over Space (1990 – 2001) (Unit: %) 
 Sorghum Corn Rice Wheat Upland Cotton Soybean 
US 8.8 10.0 5.2 7.1 8.1 7.0 
State (TX) 10.4 11.0 7.5 11.2 9.0 15.6 
Ag. District 
(District 9, TX) 17.0 25.2 7.4
* 25.0 23.4 18.1 
County 
(Brazoria, TX)** 21.4 26.3 14.2 N/A 31.1 23.1 
 
* Rice production area is mainly located in District 9 so that CVs for state and for agricultural district are 
very similar. 
** Brazoria county is selected because this county cultivates various crops.  Most of counties in the 
Southeast Texas area cultivate only rice, soybean and sorghum. 
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To see the effects of time on the CV, we assume a 5-year GHGE offset 
agreement, that is, we monitor the quantity of GHGE offset in 5 years.  In this case, we 
need to find the CV using five year moving average.  Table 21 contains CVs for 5-year 
moving average offsets evaluated at each regional scale showing that aggregation over 
time reduces the CV as we expect.  In case of soybeans, the CV or 5 year cumulative 
yield at the US level is 2.5%, while it is 3.9% for Texas, 5.4% for district 9 and 8.7% for 
the county. 
EPIC Simulation 
We can use EPIC to generate a GHGE offset density function.  EPIC1015 is used to 
simulate the GHGE offset rates over 25 years in the Southeast Texas area under various 
weather scenarios, which is the source of variability in GHGE offset rates.  Figure 12 
depicts the carbon inventory changes from the EPIC results under various weather 
scenarios in the specific area.   
 
 
Table 21. CV for Yield Over Time* (5 year interval): (Unit: %) 
 Sorghum Corn Rice Wheat Upland Cotton Soybean 
US 1.3 4.6 2.0 4.3 1.5 2.5 
State (TX) 3.3 2.8 2.2 5.2 3.3 3.9 
Ag. District 
(District 9, TX) 2.9 6.0 2.3 5.7 5.9 5.4 
County 
(Brazoria, TX) 5.1 8.6 5.3 N/A 13.9 8.7 
 
* The CV under 5-year agreement is the CV of five year moving averages for each crop at each level of 
aggregation. 
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In order to develop realistic weather scenarios, we need to use other weather 
station information.  For example, we can use the weather information in North of Texas 
for dryer growing season scenario when we simulate the Southeast Texas area.  We select 
7 weather stations for generating various weather series17, and then we run EPIC to 
generate the GHGE offset of pastures on low erosive soil over time on the one of county in 
the Southeast Texas area (Brazoria county). 
The net GHGE offset flux is obtained difference between two successive estimates 
of inventory such that (Smith and Heath): 
(67) t tRate of SOC/ac/yr Inventory Inventory 1−= −  
Figure 12 depicts carbon inventory over time under various weather scenarios from 
EPIC simulations. 
In turn, EPIC is run to estimate the GHGE offset rates over 25 years under 
various regions in Southeast Texas area18 under assumptions that are the Conroe weather 
applies to all locations, same soil type (low erosive soil), and same management option 
(pasture) to see the spatial scale aggregation.  Figure 13 depicts the carbon inventory 
changes in each region from the EPIC results over 5 regions in the Southeast Texas area 
under the same weather forecast. 
 
                                                 
17 We use following scenarios: (1) dryer and cooler growing season (Stratford, Dimmit, Seminole (weather 
stations in North)), (2) mild growing season (Coleman, Conroe (weather stations in Central)), and (3) 
wetter and hotter growing season (Liberty, and Anahuac (weather stations in Southeast)).      
18 We select 5 regions such as Grimes, Liberty, Colorado, Harris, and Brazoria counties which are located 
in the Southeast Texas. 
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Figure 12.  Carbon inventory changes of pasture on low erosive soil under various 
weather scenarios from EPIC simulations over time 
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Figure 13.  Carbon inventory changes of pasture on low erosive soil of various 
regions from EPIC simulations 
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Table 22 contains CVs for five year moving average over each weather scenario 
and region after generating the simulated GHGE offset rates.  As shown in Table 22, the 
CV of the GHGE offset rate for the specific region is presumed to be 15.3% which is an 
average of 7 CVs under various weather scenarios.  If we consider 5-year GHGE 
contract, then the CV for the simulated GHGE offset rate decreases to 10.2%. 
We can see the aggregation effect across regions in Table 22. The CV for 
aggregation over regions is computed as 9.4%.  As we expected, the aggregation over 
space reduces the CV while the CV for individual region varies 13.6% ~ 36.0% 
Estimation of Uncertainty Discount 
We need to estimate the uncertainty discount needed to attain a given confidence 
interval.  Assume that GHGE credits should be claimed with 95% certainty.  The GHGE 
credit buyer is interested in more certain measure of offset volume than the mean.   
   
 
Table 22. CV for GHGE Offset Rates from EPIC Simulations: (Unit: %) 
 Region 1 under various weather      
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 Average 
CV 12.9 13.6 17.0 16.9 17.0 14.2 15.4 15.3 
CV for 5-year 7.2 7.2 13.2 12.7 13.1 7.4 11.0 10.2 
 Various Regions under weather 1     Aggregation
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5   Over regions
CV 15.2 23.3 36.0 17.5 13.6   9.4 
CV for 5-year 10.9 12.0 21.8 10.8 7.3   5.6 
Note: W1, W2 – Wetter season (weather in Southeast); W3, W4, W5 – Dryer season (weather in North); 
         and W6, W7 – mild season (weather in Central) 
          R1 – Liberty, R2 – Grimes, R3 – Colorado, R4 – Harris, and R5 - Brazoria 
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We assume that sample size is sufficient to use normal density so that  would 
be 1.64 with 95% confidence band.  However, there are two difficulties when we 
estimate UNCER: (i) selection of regional scale and (ii) selection of crop of the best 
proxy for Q when we use crop yields CVs.  We will use an agricultural district as a 
regional scale with 5-year GHGE offset agreement, because the AO project is likely to 
be implemented in several counties and with a multi year contract.  Also we will select 
the average of the CVs for crop yields as the proxy for variability in Q which is 4.7%.  In 
this case, UNCER is computed as 10.2% (= t
*t
* × 1/R × CV = 1.64 × 1.32 × 4.7%) with 
95% confidence band.   
If we utilize the results from the EPIC simulation, UNCER would be 9.2% (= 
1.64×5.6%) under aggregation across several reasons with a multi year contract.  We use 
an average of both UNCER estimates as the UNCER for the AO project, which is 9.7% 
(= (10.2% + 9.2%)/2). 
Uncertainty Discount and Implication 
UNCER is approximated as 9.7% with 95% confidence band.  This implies that around 
10 units out of 100 units of Q cannot be salable.  If we decrease the confidence band to 
90%, then UNCER decreases to 7.6%.   
GHGE Credits 
It is interesting to compute the quantity of salable offsets created by adopting the AO 
project after considering all the discounts.  This is reported in Table 23.  Scenario F1 has 
the largest GHGE credit which is 77.5% of the total GHGE offset.  The lowest scenario 
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is A1 scenario under rice to other crops conversion which is only 38.9% of the total 
GHGE offset.  Approximately, afforestation can claim 70% of total GHGE offset as a 
credit, pasture can claim 55% of total GHGE offset as a credit and rice to other crops 
conversion can claim 40% of total GHGE offset as a credit. 
Note that the additionality and the leakage discounts play an important role in 
computing the GHGE credits in case of a conversion to other crops but less so pasture 
conversions and even less for forest conversions.  The permanence discount is important 
when for soils and short rotation forestry.  Thus, scenarios which allow reverting back to 
the pre-AO practice have the large permanence discounts such as crop mix A1, pasture 
A1 and F3.   
 
 
 
 
Table 23. GHGE Credit as Percent of Total Quantity of GHGE Offset for Each 
Alternative  
  ADD LEAK PERM UNCER GHGE 
  (%) (%) (%) (%) Credit 
      % of total QGHGO 
Rice to A1 27.3 38.5 3.7 9.7 38.9 
Crop Mix A2 27.3 38.5 0.0 9.7 40.4 
Rice to A1 13.4 17.9 29.7 9.7 45.1 
Pasture A2 13.4 17.9 0.0 9.7 64.2 
Rice to F1 2.8 11.7 0.0 9.7 77.5 
Forest F2 2.8 11.7 3.1 9.7 75.1 
 F3 2.8 11.7 31.9 9.7 52.8 
 F4 2.8 11.7 9.2 9.7 70.4 
 F5 2.8 11.7 11.6 9.7 68.5 
 F6 2.8 11.7 7.1 9.7 72.0 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation analyzes the role and implications of discount factors that might be 
applied to the GHGE mitigation projects, largely concentration on Agricultural Offset 
(AO) activities.  The analysis focuses on theoretical and empirical approaches regarding 
the motivation for estimation of and incorporation of discount factors.  Note that these 
discount factors are basically imposed by credit purchasers due to noncompliance with 
regulatory programs of some part of the credits with GHG program including 
consideration of shortfall penalties and limited duration.   
The discount factor allows comparison of mitigation strategies when they 
consider multiple GHG mitigation possibilities.  In this context, it is important to figure 
out how much GHGE offset can be really created by an AO project.  Also, government 
or regulatory agencies who supervise and/or facilitate GHGE credit trading 
internationally or domestically would want estimates of the creditable amount given an 
offset possibilities.  Discount factors are proposed for (i) additionality, (ii) leakage, (iii) 
permanence, and (iv) uncertainty. 
Additionality concerns arise when the region where a sequestration project is 
being proposed would have substantial adoption of the AO practice in the absence of 
GHG programs.  Additionality generally reduces the quantity of GHGE offset (Q).  In 
other words, most of additionality is positive and salable GHGE offset reduces.  In some 
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cases, additionality may make the GHGE offset larger if normal actions would have 
increased GHGE. 
In order to examine additionality, we propose a project-based approach and to do 
this, the prediction of land use is very important.  In this study, two methods are 
proposed: (i) a Markov model and (ii) a Land share model.  According to the empirical 
examination in Southeast Texas area, the additionality discount is computed to be 27.3% 
when rice to other crops project is adopted, 13.4% when rice lands are converted to 
pasture lands.  When producers convert their rice fields to forestlands, the additionality 
discount is estimated to be 2.8%.  In case of afforestation, this implies that 97.2% of the 
total GHGE offset created by afforestation can be claimed as a GHGE credit. 
Leakage arises when the effect of a program is offset by an induced increase in 
economic activity and accompanying emissions elsewhere.  The leakage effect may be 
substantial because both demand and supply elasticity are inelastic for agricultural 
product. We propose a formula to calculate the leakage discount that consisting 
exogenous variables such as elasticities, carbon sequestration rates and initial land 
allocations under multi-land use consideration. 
In case of conversion of rice lands to other crops in Southeast Texas area, we 
find the leakage discount of 38.5%.  This implies that the salable GHGE offset is 
reduced by 38.5% because of additional GHGE in other areas.   In case of conversion of 
rice lands to pasture and afforestation, the leakage discounts are computed to be 17.9%, 
and 11.7%, respectively.   
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The permanence discount reflects the saturation and volatility characteristics of 
carbon sequestration.  The year of saturation for tillage changes depends on soil, climate 
and many other factors but may be largely achieved around 20 years.  In forestry case, it 
is around 80 years.  Carbon is stored in a volatile form and can be released quickly to the 
atmosphere when an AO practice is discontinued and system reverts back to the pre-AO 
practice equilibrium.   
The permanence discount depends on the AO project design including aspects of 
practice continuation, forest harvest, management, and replanting decisions after the AO 
program is over.  Also, consideration of multiple offsets is important because the AO 
project could involve other GHGE offsets such as reductions in emissions of CO2, CH4 
and N2O, which are permanent GHG removal.  In this case, the permanence discount is 
smaller compared with the permanence discount for the single offset case.   
We assume a 100-year time horizon, 4% constant interest rate and alternative 
cases for harvesting management.  Based on such assumptions, there are 2 cases for 
conversion to other crops or pasture and 6 cases for afforestation.  Most of the 
permanence discounts are positive which vary from 0.0% to 31.9%.  Shorter rotations in 
forestry exhibit the large permanence discount. 
The uncertainty discount arises due to the stochastic nature of project offset 
quantity.  The uncertainty discount is discussed in Chapter VI and we adopt the simple 
definition that uncertainty is a lack of confidence in a expected GHGE offset quantity.  
For the purposes of this study we will assume the variability in the quantity of the 
GHGE offset can be proxied by the agricultural district level GHGE offset distribution 
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on a multi year basis (we use 5 years).  Also, we assume the variability in the quantity of 
the GHGE offset can be simulated using the EPIC model. 
It is noteworthy that the uncertainty discount tends to be smaller the larger the 
size of the offset contract due to aggregation over space and time because the uncertainty 
discount is defined in terms of the coefficient of variation.  With 95% confidence 
interval, the uncertainty discount is computed to be 9.7%.   
The magnitude of these discounts is investigated in the Southeast Texas rice 
discontinuation study.  Based on discussions, the additionality and the leakage discounts 
are found to play an important role in case of rice lands conversion to other crops but 
less so for pasture conversions and yet less for forest conversions.  The permanence 
discount is important when converting to other crops and short rotation forestry.  Thus, 
scenarios which allow reverting back to the pre-AO practice have the large permanence 
discounts such as crop mix A1, pasture A1 and F3.  
When all discounts are considered, the GHGE credit is computed as a proportion 
of the total GHGE offset.  Afforestation yields claimable credits amounting to between 
52.8% and 77.5% of the total GHGE offset.  When converting rice lands to pasture 
yields claimable credits from 45.1% to 64.2% of the total GHGE offset, while a 
conversion of rice lands to other crops yields claimable credits from 38.9% to 40.4%.   
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